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Management	Summary		
Emergency	 relief	 is	 an	 industry	 focusing	 on	 rapid	 life-saving	 assistance.	 The	 environment	 is	
complex,	 the	 context	 fragile	 and	 rapidly	 changing	 circumstances	 cause	 operations	 to	 be	
unpredictable.	80	percent	of	all	funds	are	spent	on	logistics,	out	of	which	40	percent	are	wasted.	
Increasing	 efficiency	 of	 humanitarian	 operations	 makes	 more	 resources	 available	 to	 directly	
address	humanitarian	needs	and	strengthens	accountability	 to	donors.	The	hypothesis	 is	 that,	
detecting	and	addressing	impediments	in	communication	processes	increases	the	efficiency	of	
humanitarian	operations	as	information	flow	(IF)	determines	material	flow.	Therefore,	this	thesis	
asks	which	impediments	to	IF	exist,	elaborates	several	ideas	for	improvement	of	these	processes	
and	seeks	to	make	the	findings	available	in	a	handy	format	for	practitioners.		
The	research	is	done	based	on	the	data	collected	of	the	exchanges	with	13	relief	experts	working	
for	five	International	Humanitarian	Organisations	(IHO)	and	the	humanitarian	department	of	a	
governmental	organisation.	Three	research	methods	were	applied:	 interviews,	a	questionnaire	
and	a	process	mapping.	The	context	of	emergency	relief	was	explored	through	four	interviews.	A	
clear	definition	of	roles	and	responsibilities	and	clear	lines	of	communication	were	identified	as	
important	factors	influencing	information	flow.	The	impediments	experienced	in	practice	were	
gathered	through	a	questionnaire	filled	in	by	ten	relief	experts.	High	staff	turnover	turns	out	to	
be	the	most	frequently	experienced	obstacle.	The	process	mapping	analysed	as	a	case	study	the	
humanitarian	 response	of	 the	 IHO	Medair	 to	Hurricane	Matthew	 in	Haiti	 in	October	2016.	13	
impediments	could	be	identified,	whereas	the	majority	experienced	in	practice	is	congruent	with	
the	ones	identified	by	the	literature.	Discussions	with	the	emergency	response	team	during,	and	
with	 process	 experts	 after	 the	 mapping	 served	 to	 formulate	 concrete	 recommendations	 to	
address	 these	 impediments.	 The	 recommendations	 were	 categorized	 with	 the	 help	 of	
Rosenstiel’s	theoretical	model	conditions	of	behaviour	and	three	recommendations	were	then	
elaborated	 in	 detail:	 Standardised	 forms,	 clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 and	 modification	 with	
explanatory	 statement.	 Recommendations	 and	 interview	 results	 are	 then	 translated	 into	 a	
booklet	with	practical	tips	to	improve	information	flow	in	emergency	relief	operations.		
The	 thesis	 confirms	 the	 hypothesis:	 process	 improvement	 advances	 information	 flow	 and	
increases	the	efficiency	of	humanitarian	operations.	The	recommendations	to	improve	IF	point	
at	two	approaches:	technical	and	behavioural	communication	skills	trainings	for	staff	improve	IF	
and	 management	 facilitates	 IF	 by	 inducing	 change	 through	 regulations.	 The	 findings	 are	 a	
considerable	gain,	pointing	out	specific	areas	of	intervention	to	improve	information	flows	and	
thereby	efficiency	in	emergency	relief	operations.	Future	research	may	test	the	impact	of	IF	on	
performance,	develop	the	concept	of	good	organisational	performance	in	an	IHO	and	test	the	
influence	of	the	strategic	position	of	logistics	within	the	IHO	on	performance.	 	
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1 Introduction	
When	Hurricane	Matthew	violently	struck	Haiti	on	October	4th	(2016),	it	resulted	in	the	country’s	
worst	humanitarian	emergency	since	the	earthquake	in	2010	(Reliefweb,	2016).	Matthew’s	storm	
surge	 caused	 considerable	 wave	 action,	 coastal	 inundation,	 mudslides,	 water	 shortages	 and	
damage	 to	 road	 infrastructure	 and	 buildings	 (Stewart,	 2017;	 Reliefweb,	 2016).	 The	 United	
Nations	(UN)	and	the	government	estimated	1.4	million	people	to	be	 in	need	of	humanitarian	
help.	 The	UN	 define	 an	 emergency	 as	 a	 “sudden	 and	 usually	 unforeseen	 event	 that	 calls	 for	
immediate	measures	to	minimize	its	adverse	consequences”	(Reliefweb,	2008,	p.	24).		
1.1 Research	Problem		
In	the	case	of	an	emergency,	humanitarian	actors	distribute	relief	items	to	cover	the	urgent	needs	
of	those	affected	by	conflict	or	disaster.	Research	indicates	that	logistic	teams	from	International	
Humanitarian	Organisations	(IHO)	spend	80	percent	of	all	funds	to	purchase	the	goods	(Thakur-
Weigold,	 Stumpf	 &	Wagner,	 2015,	 p.	 25).	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 estimated	 that	 a	 shattering	 40	
percent	of	this	part	is	ultimately	wasted	(Day,	Melnyk,	Larson,	Davis	and	Whybark,	2012,	p.	27).	
These	 inefficiencies	 limit	 the	 funding	 available	 for	 direct	 project	 costs	 addressing	 the	
humanitarian	 needs.	 Poor	 information	 flow,	 inadequate	 coordination	 efforts	 and	 conflicting	
internal	 procedures	 are	 identified	 as	 factors	 limiting	 effective	 operations	 (Reindorp	 &	Wiles,	
2001,	p.	8).	A	decade	ago,	Van	Wassenhove	(2006,	p.	477)	states	that	there	is	little	incentive	to	
improve	 performance	 based	 on	 lessons	 learned	 in	 emergencies.	 Since	 then	 however,	 the	
humanitarian	community	realised	the	importance	of	efficiency.	The	Grand	Bargain	emanated	as	
an	important	result	from	the	first	world	humanitarian	summit	in	2017:	
“The	underlying	logic	behind	the	Grand	Bargain	is	that	if	donors	and	agencies	each	make	
changes	(e.g.	if	donors	reduce	earmarking	and	agencies	are	more	transparent	with	how	
funds	 are	 spent),	 aid	 delivery	 would	 become	 more	 efficient,	 freeing	 up	 human	 and	
financial	resources	for	the	direct	benefit	of	affected	populations.”	(International	Council	
of	Voluntary	Agencies,	2017,	p.	2)	
Today	where	humanitarian	needs	are	on	the	rise,	the	trend	goes	clearly	into	the	direction	of	more	
efficiency,	whereas	 ten	years	ago	this	was	not	 the	case.	This	 thesis	 looks	at	 the	 factors	which	
condition	this	inefficiency.	
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Information	 sharing	 is	often	considered	as	a	generic	 cure	 for	 supply	 chain	ailments	and	 relief	
chain	 coordination	 is	 considered	 as	 key	 to	 improve	 its	 performance	 (Balcik,	 Beamon,	 Krejci,	
Muramatsu	&	Ramirez,	2015,	p.	22;	Forrester,	1958).	Day,	Junglas	and	Leiser	(2009,	p.	653)	reflect	
on	 how	 information	 sharing	 might	 mitigate	 the	 effects	 of	 information	 impediments	 and	
contribute	to	an	improved	flow	of	resources.	Other	research	found	information	management	and	
relief	 activity	 coordination	 to	 be	 one	 area	 where	 research	 can	 contribute	 to	 the	 field	 of	
humanitarian	logistics	and	supply	chain	management	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	32).		
The	environment	where	humanitarian	workers	operate	is	marked	with	complexity,	uncertainty	
and	urgency.	Most	scientific	output	sounds	promising,	however	it	remains	theoretically	abstract	
and	is	not	easily	applicable,	especially	for	small	and	middle-size	organisations.	This	Master	Thesis	
attempts	 practical	 recommendations	 for	 improvement	 of	 information	 flows	 within	 an	
organisation.	Recommendations	are	developed	based	on	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	operational	
context	of	and	impediments	to	information	flow	in	emergency	relief	operations.	
1.2 Research	Question,	Methods	and	Objective	of	Research	
This	research	sets	its	goal	to	analyse	the	information	flow	in	emergency	relief	operations	in	IHOs.	
IHOs	work	worldwide	when	 sudden	natural	disasters	 strike,	wars	occur	or	 in	 connection	with	
long-term	 conflicts.	 They	 ensure	 the	 availability	 of	 swift,	 efficient	 humanitarian	 assistance	
(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Denmark,	2017).	This	thesis	focuses	on	IHOs	operating	in	response	
to	sudden-onset	natural	disasters.	An	important	part	of	the	research	is	based	on	the	humanitarian	
response	 to	Hurricane	Matthew	 in	Haiti,	 in	October	 2016.	 The	main	 research	 question	 to	 be	
analysed	is	the	following:		
«	What	are	the	impediments	to	information	flow,	how	can	
information	 flow	 be	 improved	 and	 how	 can	 these	
improvements	be	shared	to	increase	applicability?	»		
First,	impediments	will	be	detected	and	compared	with	literature	findings.	Then,	four	conducted	
interviews	provide	the	understanding	of	the	context.	A	questionnaire	retrieves	the	experienced	
impediments	in	the	field.	Subsequently,	recommendations	for	improvement	will	be	crystallized	
out	of	a	process	mapping.	These	recommendations	for	action	are	finally	put	into	a	format	which	
is	easily	applicable	for	humanitarian	practitioners.		
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This	thesis	understands	under	impediments,	information	flow	and	improvements	the	following:	
Impediments	 are	 seen	 as	
obstacles	 to	 the	 process	 of	
sharing	 of	 information.	 These	
obstacles	 can	 be	 caused	 by	 the	
emergency	 setting,	 the	
organisational	 structure,	 the	
incomplete	 information	 system,	
the	 behaviour	 of	 people	 or	 the	
environment.	
Information	 flow	 is	 seen	 in	 the	
wider	perspective	of	information	
management,	 meaning	 that	
information	 undergoes	 several	
process	steps	from	acquisition	to	
organisation	 and	 to	 the	 use	 of	
the	information	(Detlor,	2010,	p.	
103).	 By	 Information,	 meaning-
ful	 logistics-	and	project-related	
knowledge	 exchanged	 between	
Headquarter	(HQ)	and	field	team	
is	meant.	
Improvements	 are	 expected	 in	
terms	 of	 processes	 which	
advance	productivity	 and	 foster	
efficiency,	 quality	 of	 decision	
making,	 performance	 of	 tasks	
(effectiveness)	 and	 increased	
learning.	
Table	1.2:	Definition	of	understanding	of	the	terms	impediment,	information	flow	and	improvement	in	
this	thesis.	
The	research	question	can	be	separated	in	three	parts:	
1. What	are	the	impediments	to	information	flow?		
2. How	can	information	flow	be	improved?		
3. How	should	these	improvements	be	shared?		
The	 research	methods	 interview,	 questionnaire	 and	 process	mapping	 are	 chosen	 to	 examine	
these	questions	and	serve	for	analysis	and	development	of	findings.	Rosenstiel’s	(2010,	p.	348)	
model	conditions	of	behaviour	is	chosen	to	situate	the	found	recommendations	and	to	determine	
the	associated	approach	of	intervention.	Finally,	the	discussion	ends	in	the	structure	of	a	booklet,	
summarizing	improvement	tips	for	practitioners.	The	hypothesis	assumes	that	the	improvement	
of	 processes	 advances	 information	 flow	 which	 in	 turn	 contributes	 to	 the	 efficiency	 of	
humanitarian	operations.	The	objective	is	to	confirm	scientific	findings	on	impediments	and	to	
find	 out	 which	 processes	 improve	 information	 flow.	 Also,	 this	 project	 shall	 bridge	 the	 gap	
between	 theoretical	 abstraction	 and	 the	 operational	 needs	 in	 the	 field.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 it	
summarizes	 some	 of	 the	 key	 lessons	 learnt	 in	 information	 flow	 and	 translates	 them	 to	 the	
humanitarian	field.	These	findings	shall	be	put	into	a	booklet	which	may	be	a	helpful	companion	
for	practitioners,	even	if	it	is	still	in	an	early	stage	of	development.	
1.3 Scope	of	Research	
The	past	few	decades	have	brought	immense	technological	and	managerial	innovations	enabling	
us	to	have	much	more	information	than	a	few	years	ago.	In	order	to	set	limits	to	this	vast	topic,	
the	following	section	describes	the	scope	and	delimitation	of	the	present	research.	
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Within	 an	 organisation:	 The	 research	 will	 take	 place	 within	 an	 IHO	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	 the	
behaviour	of	people	 in	the	 internal	structure.	Mainly,	the	humanitarian	response	to	Hurricane	
Matthew	of	middle-size,	 Switzerland-based	 IHO	Medair	will	 be	analysed.	 This	 enables	 a	more	
precise	 case	 study	 analysis	 where	 improvements	 could	 possibly	 be	 implemented	 within	 the	
organisation.	 In	 contrast	 to	 this	 stands	 the	 information	 sharing	 (IS)	 between	 IHOs	 discussing	
mainly	 coordination,	 cluster	 structure	 and	 IS	 platforms	 which	 would	 only	 yield	 broad	
recommendations	on	coordination	on	international	level.		
Between	headquarters	and	the	field	office:	The	sharing	of	information	seems	complex	when	done	
from	HQ	to	a	Field	Office	(FO)	as	the	communication	takes	place	via	phone	and	not	face	to	face.	
The	challenges	at	the	working	place	are	different:	the	FO	possibly	suffers	from	electricity	cuts	and	
poor	internet	bandwidth,	while	HQ	workers	have	fixed	working	hours.	Also,	the	roles	and	tasks	
differ.	Therefore,	the	exchange	of	information	between	HQ	and	FO	can	be	challenging	and	when	
striving	for	improvement	an	interesting	relation	to	research.		
Time	frame:	The	time	frame	is	set	on	the	first	ten	weeks	of	an	Emergency	Response	(ER)	in	order	
to	cover	the	period	where	relief	activity	was	accomplished.		
Information	type:	The	information	analysed	is	operational:	In	the	beginning	of	an	ER,	decisions	
on	the	operating	base,	the	project	locations,	the	setup	of	a	supply	chain	and	discussions	on	the	
project	design	needs	to	be	made	with	HQ.	Logisticians	as	well	as	project	staff	are	interviewed	on	
how	they	share	relevant	information	to	HQ	or	field,	depending	on	their	function	and	location.		
SPECIFICS	
Case	 Hurricane	Matthew,	Haiti,	October	4	to	mid-December	2016	
Information	flow	 Within	an	IHO,	between	HQ	and	FO,	departments	of	emergency	response	and	
logistics		
Time	frame	 First	ten	weeks,	starting	from	the	arrival	of	the	team	on	ground	until	the	almost-
completion	of	the	first	relief	project,	the	Quick	Impact	Project	(QIP)		
Information	type	 Operational	information:	logistics	needs,	program	planning,	changes	in	situational	
circumstances	and	related	process,	money	and	information	flows	
Table	1.3:	Specifics	of	research.	
1.4 Outline		
The	thesis	is	structured	as	follows.	First,	some	contextual	understanding	is	given	on	the	fields	of	
emergency	relief,	humanitarian	logistics	and	information	sharing.	Second,	the	method	design	and	
approach	is	set	out	in	more	detail.	Third,	the	results	are	presented,	consisting	of	the	evaluation	
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of	 interviews,	questionnaire	and	process	mapping.	Four	major	 impediments	 (decision	making,	
time	difference,	shortage	of	funds	and	too	many	variables)	are	extracted	and	each	summarizes	
different	 impediments	 to	 information	 flow.	 The	 established	 recommendations	 are	 then	
incorporated	 into	 an	 adapted,	 best-case	 scenario	 process	map	 completing	 the	 result	 section.	
Fourth,	the	results	are	discussed	against	the	background	of	the	literature	and	recommendations	
for	improvement	are	categorised	and	three	of	them	are	elaborated.	At	the	end	of	the	section,	
the	booklet	is	presented,	summarizing	key	improvements	of	information	flow	for	humanitarian	
workers.	Finally,	the	conclusion	provides	an	answer	to	the	research	question	and	reflects	on	the	
limitations,	 implications,	general	 learnings	and	other	researchers	that	may	concentrate	on	this	
area.		 	
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2 Literature	review	
Besides	 the	 selective	 and	 situational	 picture	 of	 disasters	 shown	 by	 media	 in	 the	 immediate	
aftermath,	 the	 everyday	 conditions	 in	 which	 emergency	 relief	 workers	 operate,	 are	 mostly	
unknown.	This	section	looks	first	at	the	context	and	explains	the	differences	between	logistics	in	
the	private	sector	compared	to	the	humanitarian	field.	The	goal	of	humanitarian	logistics	 is	to	
save	more	 lives	while	private	 logistics	 aims	at	profit	maximisation.	 Yet,	 the	 connection	 to	 the	
private	sector	for	learning	objectives	is	useful	in	some	areas,	even	if	it	stays	limited	in	others	due	
to	 its	 different	 working	 environment	 and	 goal.	 Due	 to	 the	 high	 importance	 of	 logistics	 in	
emergency	 relief,	 we	 then	 look	 at	 the	 context	 and	 the	 uniqueness	 of	 humanitarian	 logistics.	
Because	of	the	fact	that	information	systems	support	logistics	and	supply	chain	issues	(Maiers,	
Reynolds	and	Haselkorn,	2005,	p.	82)	it	is	focused	on	information	flow	(IF)	as	third	subsection.	A	
definition	of	IF	is	attempted	and	then	the	focus	is	turned	to	impediments	to	IF	and	how	processes	
assist	for	their	analysis.	
2.1 Characteristics	of	Emergency	Relief		
How	is	a	disaster	defined	and	what	 is	the	difference	operating	 in	the	humanitarian	versus	the	
commercial	 sector?	 Both	 are	 compared	 and	 some	 typical	 characteristics	 like	 uncertainty	 and	
complexity	 are	 reflected	 upon.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 explicated	 how	 the	 humanitarian	 principles	
regulate	coordination	and	enable	effective	humanitarian	action.	
2.1.1 Definition	of	Emergency	Relief	and	Comparison	to	Commercial	Sector		
The	term	emergency	and	disaster	are	herein	used	interchangeably.	The	United	Nations	Office	for	
Disaster	Risk	Reduction	(UNISDR)	defines	disaster	as:	
“A	serious	disruption	of	the	functioning	of	a	community	or	a	society	causing	widespread	
human,	 material,	 economic	 or	 environmental	 losses	 which	 exceed	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
affected	community	or	society	to	cope	using	its	own	resources”	(Reliefweb,	2008,	p.	22).	
There	are	different	kinds	of	disasters	(compare	figure	2.1.1).	This	thesis	focuses	on	the	natural,	
sudden-onset	disaster	of	Hurricane	Matthew	in	October	2016	that	destroyed	big	landscapes	of	
Haiti	and	then	moved	up	north	along	the	eastern	coast	of	the	United	States	of	America.	However,	
some	of	 the	 responses	of	 the	experts	may	 also	 refer	 to	 slow-onset,	man-made,	 or	 combined	
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disasters	 (such	as	the	crisis	 in	South	Sudan,	a	combination	of	a	 famine	and	a	political/refugee	
crises).	
	 	
Figure	2.1.1:	Different	kinds	of	disasters	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	476).	
Disaster	 response	 describes	 the	 decisions	 and	 actions	 taken	 during	 and	 after	 a	 disaster	 and	
comprises	three	different	phases:	immediate	relief,	rehabilitation,	and	reconstruction	(Reliefweb,	
2008,	p.	22).	We	will	be	looking	at	the	immediate	relief,	emergency	response	or	emergency	relief,	
defining	it	as	the		
“immediate	 survival	 assistance	 to	 the	 victims	 of	 crisis	 and	 violent	 conflict.	Most	 relief	
operations	are	initiated	on	short	notice	and	have	a	short	implementation	period	(project	
objectives	are	generally	completed	within	a	year).	The	main	purpose	of	emergency	relief	
is	to	save	lives”	(Reliefweb,	2008,	p.	22).	
Comparing	private	with	humanitarian	logistics,	we	find	important	differences	(see	table	2.1.1).	
Aspect	 Private	 Humanitarian	
Purpose	 Economic	Profit	 Social	impact	
Context	 Uninterrupted	 Interrupted		
Perspective	on	time	 Time	is	money	 Time	is	life	(or	death)	
People	served	 Paying	customers	 Beneficiaries	
Source	of	funds	 Paying	customers	 Donors	
Workforce	 Paid	staff	 Volunteers,	paid	staff	
Table	2.1.1:	Commercial	logistics	versus	humanitarian	logistics	(Tatham	&	Christopher,	2014,	p.	21).	
The	 context	 is	 one	 of	 complexity	 and	 uncertainty	 resulting	 from	 a	 diversity	 of	 factors	 (Van	
Wassenhove	2006;	Tatham	&	Spens,	2011).	Humanitarian	workers	often	operate	under	a	high	
level	of	uncertainty	in	terms	of	demand,	supplies	and	assessment	(Day	et	al.,	2009).	Achieving	a	
timely	and	comprehensive	picture	of	what	is	required	is	often	a	big	challenge,	due	to	difficulties	
of	reaching	beneficiaries	(Tatham	&	Spens,	2011,	p.	10).	Access	to	remote	areas	can	be	a	huge	
problem,	especially	after	a	disaster	destroyed	inevitable	infrastructure	or	when	the	infrastructure	
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is	not	existent	in	the	first	place.	Also,	one	may	not	be	able	to	anticipate	or	see	local	factors	such	
as	customs	and	habits	as	they	are	invisible	(Van	Wassenhove	2006,	p.	478).	Or	the	interactivity	of	
factors	may	 cause	 another	 disaster	 (e.g.	 after	 long	 periods	 of	 rain,	mudslides	 are	 likely)	 (Van	
Wassenhove	2006,	p.	478).	Often,	factors	such	as	the	lack	of	resources,	trained	personnel	and	
accurate	 information	 also	 contribute	 to	 complexity.	 The	 cause-effect	 relationship	 when	 the	
disaster	 escalates	 seems	 generally	 unclear	 and	 one	 cannot	 tell	 the	 causing	 variables	 (Van	
Wassenhove	2006,	p.	478).	Disasters	are	completely	different	one	to	another,	therefore	using	
evaluations	for	a	next	operation	is	not	always	obvious.	High	staff	turnover	is	a	contributing	factor	
to	complexity	and	limits	institutional	knowledge	and	learning	(Thomas	&	Mizushima,	2005,	p.	60;	
Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	477).		
Multiple	stakeholders	are	involved,	including	donors	with	their	legitimate	claim	for	information	
(Thakur-Weigold,	 Besiou	 &	 Wagner,	 in	 press).	 Non-Governmental	 Organisations	 (NGO)	 have	
stakeholders	that	do	not	pay	for	their	service	(e.g.	beneficiaries),	however	still	have	an	important	
stake	 in	 the	 organisation.	 Hence,	 internal	 and	 external	 communication,	 rising	 donor	
accountability	and	transparency	place	high	demands	on	the	organisation.	The	likely	absence	of	
stable	communication	infrastructure	complicates	information	flow	even	more	(Tatham	&	Spens,	
2011)	and	the	need	for	robust	equipment	is	definite	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006).	
Finally,	the	pressure	of	time	determines	between	life	and	death.	Urgent	responsiveness	is	one	of	
the	 most	 mentioned	 factors	 in	 humanitarian	 response.	 It	 appears	 to	 push	 the	 performance	
criterion	of	efficiency	to	second	place	(Day	et	al.,	2009,	p.	639).	Day	et	al.	(2009,	p.	638)	find	in	
their	analysis	of	the	Hurricane	Katrina	response	that	the	efforts	to	provide	help	were	inefficient.	
This	is	seen	in	contrast	to	the	private	sector,	where	the	performance	of	the	supply	chain	is	directly	
rewarded	by	the	market	through	higher	revenues	and	profits	and	internal	incentives	like	bonuses	
advance	 constant	 improvement	 (Van	 Wassenhove,	 2006,	 p.477).	 However,	 if	 humanitarian	
operations	were	more	efficient,	more	lives	could	be	saved.		
2.1.2 Humanitarian	Principles		
Humanitarian	 action	 is	 based	 on	 the	 four	 principles	 of	 humanity,	 neutrality,	 impartiality	 and	
independence	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	478).	Humanitarian	actors	thus	do	not	operate	 in	a	
certain	area	because	a	political	party	says	so,	but	trust	their	needs	assessment	and	assist	where	
the	greatest	needs	are.	In	order	to	establish	and	maintain	access	to	people	affected	by	natural	
disaster	or	complex	emergencies	and	deliver	effective	humanitarian	aid,	the	compliance	with	the	
principles	 is	 essential	 (United	 Nations	 Office	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 Humanitarian	 Affairs	
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UNOCHA,	2012).	The	principles	were	derived	from	the	International	Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	
and	the	national	Red	Cross/Red	Crescent	Societies	and	endorsed	in	General	Assembly	resolution	
46/182	(UN	General	Assembly,	1991).	The	fourth	key	principle	independence	was	added	in	2004	
by	General	 Assembly	 resolution	 58/114	 (UNOCHA,	 2012).	 Humanitarian	 action	 takes	 place	 in	
complex	 political	 and	militarized	 environments	 (UNOCHA,	 2012).	 The	 humanitarian	 principles	
distinguish	humanitarian	action	from	political,	military	or	other	actors	(UNOCHA,	2012).		
Promoting	 the	 adherence	 to	 humanitarian	 principles	 is	 essential	 for	 effective	 humanitarian	
coordination	 (UNOCHA,	 2012).	 The	 commitment	 to	 these	 principles	 is	 expressed	 at	 an	
institutional	level	through	the	Code	of	Conduct	for	the	International	Red	Cross	and	Red	Crescent	
Movement	 and	 International	 Non-Governmental	 Organisations	 (INGO)	 in	 disaster	 relief.	 The	
humanitarian	charter	as	well	as	the	minimum	standards	in	humanitarian	response	elaborated	by	
the	Sphere	Project	serve	as	standards	for	the	sector	(UNOCHA,	2012).	
2.2 Humanitarian	Logistics	
Relief	goods	are	purchased	in	a	logistics	department	in	order	to	distribute	them	to	beneficiaries	
urgently	needing	them.	Most	of	the	funds	go	into	logistics,	thus	this	is	where	improvements	will	
have	the	biggest	impact	on	efficiency	and	therefore	performance	of	the	operation.	The	ultimate	
goal	of	an	IHO	is	to	alleviate	suffering;	if	this	can	be	done	more	efficiently,	goods	are	distributed	
faster	and	to	more	people	which	results	in	more	lives	being	saved.	The	next	section	compares	
private	 with	 humanitarian	 logistics,	 defines	 humanitarian	 logistics,	 views	 its	 uniqueness	 and	
reflects	on	the	use	of	information	technologies.		
2.2.1 Context	and	Definition	of	Humanitarian	Logistics	
Donors	 are	 becoming	more	 aware	 of	 expenses	 and	 thus	 put	 IHOs	 under	 greater	 scrutiny	 to	
monitor	 their	 impact	 (Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	475).	 IHOs	 therefore	strive	 to	become	more	
results-oriented,	 accountable	 and	 more	 transparent	 (Van	 Wassenhove,	 2006,	 p.	 475).	
Humanitarian	disaster	relief	supply	chains	directly	influence	60	to	80	percent	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	
27;	Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	475;	Wagner,	Thakur-Weigold	&	Stumpf,	2013,	p.	30)	of	the	total	
spend	of	 IHOs.	Van	Wassenhove	 (2006,	p.	475)	and	Kelly	 (1995)	 therefore	suggest	 to	achieve	
transparency	through	efficient	and	effective	logistics	operations,	thus	well	planned	Supply	Chain	
Management	(SCM).	It	is	estimated	that	more	than	40	percent	of	this	spend	is	ultimately	wasted	
due	to	duplication	of	effort	and	lack	of	time	for	effective	spend	analysis	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	27;	
	 10	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	2015).	Therefore,	analysing	and	 improving	 logistics	 is	key	for	 improving	
performance.	Humanitarian	logistics	is	defined	as:	
“The	process	of	planning,	implementing	and	controlling	the	efficient,	cost-effective	flow	
and	storage	of	goods	and	materials,	as	well	as	related	information,	from	point	of	origin	
to	point	of	consumption	for	the	purpose	of	meeting	the	end	beneficiary’s	requirements”	
(Thomas	&	Mizushima,	2005,	p.	60).		
This	 definition	 includes	 the	 tasks	 of:	 preparedness,	 planning,	 procurement,	 transport,	
warehousing,	tracking	and	tracing	as	well	as	customs	clearance	(Thomas	&	Mizushima,	2005,	p.	
60).	 Logistics	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 providing	 valuable	 perspectives	 on	 the	 effectiveness	 and	
efficiency	of	an	operation	as	well	 as	 for	post-event	 learning	 (Cozzolino,	2012,	p.	6;	Tatham	&	
Spens,	2011,	p.	13).		
2.2.2 Comparison	with	the	Private	Sector		
To	 the	 private	 sector,	 logistics	 is	 a	 planning	 framework	 for	 the	management	 of	 information,	
material,	 service	 and	 financial	 systems	 (Van	Wassenhove,	 2006,	 p.	 476).	 The	 business	 sector	
understood	long	ago	that	logistics	is	crucial	to	performance,	provides	a	rich	source	of	data	and	is	
the	most	expensive	part	of	any	operation	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	476).	Subsequently,	 the	
industry	 has	 realized	 the	 importance	 of	 using	 efficient	 supply	 chains	 as	well	 as	 inclusion	 into	
planning	and	budgeting	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	476).	Unfortunately,	humanitarian	logistics	
of	INGOs	is	around	15	years	behind	in	terms	of	strategic	positioning	within	planning.	
	
Figure	2.2.2:	The	vicious	circle	of	logistics	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	477).	
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Even	 though	 logistics	 plays	 a	 key	 role	 in	 many	 INGOs	 (Tatham	 &	 Spens,	 2011,	 p.	 14),	 their	
department	 (if	 logistics	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 department	 at	 all)	 is	 seldom	 involved	 in	 strategic	
planning,	resulting	in	a	vicious	circle:	the	lack	of	understanding	for	the	function	and	its	importance	
leads	 to	 non-inclusion	 in	 planning	 and	 budgetary	 processes	 (e.g.	 in	 proposals),	 resulting	 in	
logistics	 requirements	 not	 being	 met	 (e.g.	 delays	 in	 reporting)	 and	 therefore	 a	 firefighting	
mentality	prevails	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	477).		
On	top	of	that,	most	funding	is	directly	for	relief	and	thus,	support	services	obtain	little	resources	
for	development	(Thomas	&	Mizushima,	2005,	p.	60).	This	is	in	stark	contrast	to	the	private	sector	
were	developments	are	fostered	to	push	efficiency	and	thereby	making	more	profit.	Thomas	and	
Mizushima	(2005,	p.	61)	found	in	their	survey	with	92	humanitarian	logisticians	that	there	is	no	
systematised	 and	 comprehensive	 training	 in	 humanitarian	 logistics,	 albeit	 great	 need	 and	
potential	do	exist.	The	same	authors	(Thomas	&	Mizushima,	2005,	p.	60)	thus	pledge	for	a	more	
standardised	 logisticians	 training	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 efficient	 operations,	 improved	
communication	 and	 cooperation	 and	 improvement	 of	 job	 satisfaction	 and	 mobility	 through	
external	skills	validation.	The	next	section	explains	why	this	training	must	be	different	to	private	
sector	SCM	trainings:	because	of	the	uniqueness	of	humanitarian	SCM.	
2.2.3 Uniqueness	of	Humanitarian	Supply	Chains	
Van	 Wassenhove	 (2006,	 p.	 480)	 describes	 supply	 chains	 as	 a	 network	 between	 suppliers,	
distributors	and	customers	which	is	supported	by	three	kind	of	flows:	material,	information	and	
financial	flows.	Humanitarian	supply	chains	are	unique	in	different	ways	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	24)	
(Table	2.2.3).	
Van	Wassenhove	 hits	 the	 nail	 on	 its	 head	 by	 saying	 "unlike	 logisticians	 in	 the	 private	 sector,	
humanitarians	are	always	 faced	with	 the	unknown"	 (Van	Wasenhove,	2006,	p.	480).	And	still,	
uncertainty	is	also	part	of	the	private	sector.	Tatham	and	Christopher	(2014,	p.	9)	see	uncertainty	
as	the	key	connection	between	commerce	and	humanitarian	logistics	and	advise	to	synchronize	
activities	across	networks.	This	enables	flexible	responses	to	changes	in	demand.	Synchronization	
must	partly	be	achieved	through	technology	solutions,	which	is	described	in	the	next	subsection.		
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UNIQUENESS		 AUTHORS	
Command	and	control	issues:	if	the	local	government	does	not	
request	it,	no	international	action	can	take	place	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	24	
Life	and	death	vs.	profit	and	loss	 Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	25	
Short	supply	chain	life-cycles:	new	networks	of	relationships	have	to	
evolve	within	hours	and	subside	in	a	matter	of	months,	comparable	
to	transient	supply	chains	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	23	+	640		
	
Supply	chain	formation:	always	changing	stakeholders,	security	is	a	
fundamental	issue	and	alternatives	are	limited	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	25	
Centralized	vs.	decentralized	coordination	systems:	where	an	
understanding	of	local	conditions	is	important,	a	central	authority	far	
from	the	action	makes	suboptimal	decisions	
Dolinskaya	et	al.,	2011,	p.	3;	
Stephenson,	2005,	p.	340;	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	press	
Decision	making:	much	of	the	decision	making	favours	local	
autonomy	over	centralisation	
Tatham	&	Christopher,	2014,	
p.	22	
Donor	independence:	few	resources	are	given	in	advance,	rather	as	
more	specific	needs	are	identified	and	requests	are	sent	out,	donors	
may	decide	on	what	to	give.	However,	the	donor	decides	what	they	
provide	and	that	may	not	always	be	what	agencies	and	beneficiaries	
need	(leading	to	unsolicited	goods)	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	25	
Changing	operational	priorities:	local	conditions	are	highly	dynamic,	
requiring	different	responses	and	resources	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	25	
Large	number	of	stakeholders:	uninvited	but	self-initiated	
participants,	uncoordinated	donors,	media,	governments,	the	
military,	beneficiaries	and	many	INGOs	with	different	political	
agendas,	ideologies	and	religious	beliefs	raise	concerns	regarding	
information	sharing	and	coordination.	It	is	estimated	that	the	west	is	
home	to	3-4,000	INGOs	(Tatham	and	Spens,	2011,	p.	9)	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	26;		
Tatham	&	Spens,	2011,	p.	9;		
Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	
477	
Press	coverage	and	publicity:	the	love-hate	relationship	between	
press	and	NGOs	is	reflected	in	this	paradox:	press	personal	seizes	
much-needed	resources,	though	publicity	arising	from	coverage	
generates	donations	
Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	26	
Table	2.2.3:	Factors	of	uniqueness	of	humanitarian	supply	chains.	
2.2.4 Information	Technologies	and	Integrated	Software		
Tatham	 and	 Christopher	 (2014,	 p.	 57)	 see	 the	 importance	 of	 information	 technologies	 (IT)	
support	to	logistics	and	SCM	as	a	driver	of	improved	internal	efficiency.	The	systems	of	electronic	
data	 exchange	 and	 other	 IT	 enables	 the	 transmission	 of	 data	 to	 centralized	 storage	 and	
processing	and	provides	then	real-time	data	to	all	relevant	members	of	the	supply	chain	(Sahin	&	
Robinson,	2002,	p.	514).	It	enables	quantitative	analysis	as	well	as	setting	of	performance	targets	
for	different	 supply	 chain	 functions	 (Tatham	&	Christopher,	 2014,	p.	 60).	 Sahin	and	Robinson	
(2002,	 p.	 517)	 argue	 that	 real-time	 sharing	mitigates	 demand	uncertainty,	 however	 does	 not	
completely	eliminate	it.		
Some	of	the	larger	organisations	developed	online	platforms	to	support	information	sharing	(IS)	
and	coordination	during	an	emergency	response	(Dolinskaya	et	al.,	2011,	p.	3).	 IT	systems	are	
developed	and	 rolled	out	 in	 the	preparation	phase,	 so	 that	 they	 come	 into	practice	when	an	
emergency	happens	(Cozzolino,	2012,	p.	9).	However,	most	smaller	or	middle-size	 INGOs	only	
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have	 little	budget	 (if	 at	 all)	 for	process	 improvements	between	operations.	 Funding	 is	usually	
project	based	and	few	invest	in	long-term	organisation-wide	infrastructure	(Maiers	et	al.,	2005,	
p.	86).	Donors	prefer	to	give	for	relief	and	want	to	see	beneficiaries	assisted	rather	than	expensive	
technologies	 purchased	 and	 introduced.	 Many	 donors	 still	 see	 overhead	 costs	 (including	
information	communication	systems)	as	detrimental	to	a	proposed	project	and	reduce	it	to	the	
minimum	(Maiers	et	al.,	2005,	p.	85).	To	make	matters	worse,	humanitarian	operations	require	
robust	equipment	that	can	be	set	up	and	dismantled	quickly	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	477)	and	
is	more	expensive.	Information	management	systems	using	dashboards	to	show	the	performance	
of	the	projects	are	quite	costly	when	including	the	introduction	and	training	costs.	For	this	reason,	
smaller	organisations	primarily	use	different	combined	low-budget	tools	such	as	Microsoft	Excel	
and	 different	 cloud	 services.	 IT	 surely	 facilitates	 information	 sharing,	 however	 the	 degree	 of	
facilitation	depends	on	the	resources	of	the	organisation.		
The	next	section	elaborates	the	definition	of	information	flow	and	its	impediments.		
2.3 Information	Flow		
When	operating	 in	an	emergency,	many	activities	 include	networking,	coordination,	providing	
others	with	information,	decision	making	and	giving	orders.	In	the	communication	between	HQ	
and	the	field	team,	the	communication	is	not	taking	place	face	to	face,	but	via	phone	or	video	
calls	 as	 well	 as	 through	 emails	 and	 documents	 exchange.	 The	 message	 transferred	 is	 then	
influenced	by	many	disruptions.	This	section	looks	at	the	general	basic	model	of	communication	
process	and	then	goes	on	to	define	information	flow	in	the	specific	context	of	emergency	relief.	
Moreover,	 the	 relevance	 of	 information	 flow	 upon	 material	 flow	 is	 explicated	 and	 the	
impediments	to	IF	found	in	literature	are	listed.	Finally,	process	management	tools	are	discussed	
to	provide	a	perception	of	potential	improvement	possibilities.		
2.3.1 Basic	Model	of	Communication		
When	we	 look	 at	 the	basic	model	 of	 communication,	we	 realize	 that	 there	might	 be	 a	 lot	 of	
disruption	while	sending	a	message.	The	intended	effect	may	not	be	the	same	as	the	actual	effect.	
The	information	transaction	process	is	disrupted	by	many	factors	from	the	environment,	but	also	
in	regards	to	the	person’s	behaviour	and	experiences	(Schuppener,	2017).	 In	order	to	be	sure	
that	the	receiver	has	understood	the	message	the	speaker	intended	to	send,	a	feedback	loop	is	
required.		
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Language:	The	international	language	for	disaster	relief	is	English.	However,	the	internal	language	
for	the	teams	might	be	German,	as	the	organisation	could	be	based	in	Switzerland	and	may	be	
required	 to	write	 the	 reports	 to	 institutional	 donors	 in	German.	 An	 alignment	 in	 reporting	 is	
therefore	required,	however	the	field	language	could	still	be	English.	The	language	also	impacts	
the	culture	of	an	organisation.	
	
Figure	2.3.4:	Basic	model	of	communication	(Schuppener,	2017).	
Culture	and	personality:	When	teams	communicate	with	each	other,	every	person	is	embossed	
by	 his	 culture,	 his	 personality	 as	 well	 as	 the	 working	 preferences.	 In	 disaster	 response,	 the	
expatriate	 teams	 are	 from	multicultural	 backgrounds	 and	operate	on	 the	 field	 in	 yet	 another	
culture.	It	is	useful	to	know	one’s	own	culture	and	its	orientation	in	communication:	is	it	an	explicit	
communication	 with	 rather	 indirect	 or	 intransparent	 dialogue	 (Japan)	 or	 an	 implicit	
communication	 with	 direct	 communication	 (Germany)	 (Kumbier	 &	 von	 Thun,	 2014,	 p.	 49).	
Knowing	how	the	own	culture	functions	will	enable	this	person	to	understand	the	difference	of	
other	communication	structures.		
The	same	is	true	for	the	personal	orientation	and	with	working	preferences.	Relationship	or	task	
orientation	determines	the	way	how	people	can	work	together	in	teams:	whether	a	person	sees	
trust	as	a	condition	for	success	(relationship	orientation:	“first	building	trust,	then	we	can	work	
together”)	or	as	a	result	from	efficiency	(task	orientation:	“first	we	work	efficiently	together,	then	
I	can	trust	you”)	is	a	fundamental	difference	(Kumbier	&	von	Thun,	2014,	p.	298).	A	task-oriented	
person	reproaches	a	behaviour-oriented	person	with	exaggerated	social	conduct	without	view	
for	success	and	the	behaviour-oriented	person	sees	the	task-oriented	person	as	reckless	profit	
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seeking	and	over	correctness	without	inclusion	of	situations	(Kumbier	&	von	Thun,	2014,	p.	298).	
In	an	IHO,	this	could	be	a	behaviour-oriented	field	project	officer	sharing	the	increasing	needs	of	
the	population	(as	his	team	found	a	new	region	of	destroyed	villages	not	known	before)	to	his	
task-oriented	colleague	at	HQ	who	strictly	wants	 to	 finish	a	project	 instead	of	 reacting	 to	 the	
circumstances	 and	 open	 a	 new	 project.	 The	mutual	 understanding	 seems	 crucial	 in	 order	 to	
cooperate	 sensitively	 towards	 both	 orientations.	 Also,	 the	 collaboration	 between	 teams	 can	
depend	on	the	working	preferences.	The	team	management	system	classifies	eight	roles	for	a	
successful	team	(Schuppener,	2017).	Knowing	where	one’s	preferences	lie	can	be	critical	for	the	
personal	professional	development,	fosters	team	working	and	the	organisational	culture	(Team	
Management	System,	2017).	Therefore,	based	on	a	person’s	knowledge	about	the	orientation	of	
his	 culture,	 his	 personal	 relationship	or	 task	orientation	 as	well	 as	 his	working	preferences,	 a	
person	is	more	aware	and	can	communicate	consciously.		
2.3.2 Definition	of	Information	Flow	
This	thesis	will	look	at	how	information	flows	from	HQ	to	the	field	office,	involving	several	process	
steps.	Even	though	Information	Management	(IM)	covers	a	wider	range	of	process	activities,	its	
definition	helps	to	understand	the	flow	of	information.	Information	management	can	be	defined	
as:	
“The	 application	 of	 management	 principles	 to	 the	 acquisition,	 organisation,	 control,	
dissemination	and	use	of	information	relevant	to	the	effective	operation	of	organisations	
of	all	kinds.	‘Information’	here	refers	to	all	types	of	information	of	value,	whether	having	
their	 origin	 inside	 or	 outside	 the	 organisation,	 including:	 data	 resources,	 such	 as	
production	data;	records	and	files	related,	for	example,	to	the	personnel	function;	market	
research	data;	and	competitive	 intelligence	 from	a	wide	 range	of	 sources.	 Information	
management	deals	with	the	value,	quality,	ownership,	use	and	security	of	information	in	
the	context	of	organisational	performance”	(Wilson,	2003,	p.	263).	
Information	flow	is	understood	as	all	 type	of	data	or	 information	of	value	which	are	acquired,	
organised,	 disseminated	 and	 used	 in	 the	 context	 of	 relief	 project	management	 and	 logistics.	
Tatham	 and	 Spens	 (2011,	 p.	 12f)	 differentiate	 between	 data	 (organised	 facts),	 information	
(interpreted	 data)	 and	 knowledge	 (internalization	 of	 information,	 data	 and	 experience).	 This	
thesis	looks	at	the	information	exchange	between	HQ	and	the	field.	Therefore,	the	IF	within	the	
field	 team	 or	 at	 HQ	 only	 is	 excluded.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 see	 information	 in	 the	 context	 of	
	 16	
organisational	 performance,	 because	 IF	 improvements	 are	 sought	 to	 foster	 organisational	
performance.	The	organisational	perspective	on	IM	views	information	as	a	strategic	resource.		
2.3.3 The	Impact	on	Material	Flow		
Humanitarian	logistics	definitions	generally	include	the	control	of	resource	and	information	flows	
(Thomas	 &	Mizushima,	 2005;	 Van	Wassenhove,	 2006).	Material	 flows	 represent	 the	 physical	
product	 flows	 and	 information	 flow	 represents	 order	 transmission	 and	 order	 tracking	 which	
coordinate	the	physical	flows	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	480).		
	
Figure	2.3.3a:	Relation	between	information	flow	and	material	flow.	
Figure	2.3.3a	shows	a	simplified	model	of	the	relation	between	material	and	information	flows:	
Information	flow	determines	material	flow	as	without	a	needs	assessment	with	beneficiaries,	the	
INGO	 does	 not	 know	 what	 kind	 or	 emergency	 relief	 items	 are	 requested.	 The	 INGO	 then	
processes	this	information.	Fundraising	kicks	in	to	receive	finances	for	a	certain	distribution	and	
the	INGO	procures	relief	items	through	suppliers.	These	items	then	pass	through	a	distribution	
unit	such	as	a	regional	headquarter	and	is	finally	distributed	to	the	beneficiaries.	
In	their	mathematical	analysis,	Lee,	So	and	Tang	(2000,	p.	626)	found	that	the	value	of	demand	
information	sharing	can	be	of	crucial	importance,	especially	in	complex	cases.	If	the	organisation	
did	not	have	the	needs	information	in	the	first	place,	they	would	not	know	what	relief	items	are	
requested.	 Knowing	 the	 context,	 the	 climate	 and	 the	 culture	 is	 crucial	 for	 planning.	 Thakur-
Weigold	et	al.	(2015,	p.29)	show	in	their	study	on	training	humanitarian	workers	how	information	
and	resource	flows	in	relief	look	like.	The	humanitarian	supply	chain	is	an	interconnected	system	
involving	flows	of	goods,	funds	and	information	(figure	2.3.3b).	
Suppliers
Donors 
Distribution Unit 
/ NGO Beneficiaries
Material Flow
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Figure	2.3.3b:	The	integration	of	goods	and	information	in	a	humanitarian	supply	chain	(Thakur-Weigold	
et	al.,	2015,	p.	29).	
Many	researchers	correlate	improved	IF	with	better	performance	(Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	2015;	
Tatham	&	Christopher,	2012;	Anand	&	Mendelson,	1997).	Thakur-Weigold	et	al.	 (2015,	p.	29)	
states	that	not	even	personal	knowledge,	but	missing	well-managed	information	flows	can	set	up	
humanitarian	logistics	to	fail.	Tatham	and	Christopher	(2012,	p.	61)	found	that	the	introduction	
of	 an	 online	 SCM	 application	 produces	 better	 and	 more	 timely	 information	 which	 in	 turn	
supportes	 better	 management	 practices.	 Van	 Wassenhove	 (2006,	 p.	 475)	 sees	 better	
preparedness	as	a	mitigation	of	the	effects	from	man-made	disasters.	On	the	other	hand,	Day	et	
al.	(2009,	p.	640)	states	that	despite	introductions	of	information	systems,	appropriate	system	
performance	remains	ambiguous.	
Scientific	research	lays	considerable	emphasis	on	the	relationship	between	IF	improvement	and	
the	efficiency	of	supply	chains	(Sahin	&	Robinson,	2002;	Day	et	al.,	2009;	Day	et	al.,	2012;	Akhtar,	
Marr	and	Garnevska,	2012).	Day	et	al.	(2009,	p.	638)	and	Sahin	and	Robinson	(2002)	state	that	
the	leveraging	of	information	flows	improves	supply	chain	performance	in	normal	industries.	Day	
et	al.	(2009,	p.	654)	argues	that	the	established	connection	between	IF	and	material	flow	also	
extends	 into	 disaster	 relief	 scenarios.	 Coordination	 of	 information	 flows	 and	 resource	 flows	
influences	the	efficiency	of	the	latter	(Day	et	al.,	2009,	p.	639)	and	is	seen	as	a	generic	cure	for	
supply	chain	ailments	(Sahin	&	Robinson,	2002,	p.	510).	Day	et	al.	(2009,	p.	640)	reason	that	the	
variability	and	uncertainty	can	be	better	managed,	however	in	the	context	of	disaster	relief	it	has	
not	yet	been	considered	how	to	foster	these	IF,	as	it	shall	present	substantial	difficulties.	This	is	
the	reason	why	the	thesis	looks	at	how	IF	can	be	improved.		
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Coordination	 is	 seen	 as	 an	 intermediary	 between	 information	 and	 resource	 flows.	 Good	
information	sharing	is	a	prerequisite	and	a	key	factor	for	good	coordination	(Reindorp	&	Wiles,	
2001,	p.	31;	Akhtar	et	al.,	2012,	p.	94;	Sahin	&	Robinson,	2002).	 In	 turn,	closer	collaboration	
yields	more	effective	supply	chains	(Van	Wassenhove,	2006,	p.	475).	Akthar	et	al.	(2012,	p.	96)	
views	 a	 good	 coordinator	 as	 the	 determining	 factor	 for	 timely	 deliveries.	 In	 this	 sense,	
collaboration	and	coordination	consists	of	a	wide	range	of	activities	like	negotiating,	contracting,	
measuring	 performance,	 attending	 conferences	 etc.	 (Akhtar	 et	 al.,	 2012,	 p.	 96).	 Akhtar	 et	 al.	
(2012,	 p.	 94)	 found	 that	 it	 was	 essential	 to	 not	 ignore	 any	 kind	 of	 information,	 especially	
coordinating	 activities	 such	 as	 meetings,	 appropriate	 information	 sharing	 and	 traveling	 were	
crucial	 for	 the	 success	 of	 the	 chain’s	 coordination.	 Besides	 financial	 resources	 which	 enable	
coordination	activities	(Akhtar	et	al.,	2012,	p.	94),	leadership	and	relationship	management	skills	
are	also	key	sources	for	success	(Akhtar	et	al.,	2012,	p.	96f).	The	success	or	failure	often	depends	
on	who	resumes	the	supply	chain,	how	it	is	managed	and	if	the	coordinator	is	able	to	develop	
effective	relationships	(meaning	a	commitment	to	quality	from	supplier	and	customer)	with	chain	
partners	(Wong	et	al.,	2005).		
The	 study	 of	 Day	 et	 al.	 (2009,	 p.	 650)	 showed	 that	 supply	 chain	 information	 flows	 improved	
resource	flows.	However,	information	flow	was	also	influenced	by	several	impediments	(Day	et	
al.,	2009,	p.	650).	The	sharing	and	management	of	information	in	this	complexity	is	not	a	simple	
task	(Tatham	&	Spens,	2011,	p.	9).	The	next	section	therefore	looks	at	impediments	which	thwart	
the	flow	of	information.		
2.3.4 Impediments	to	Information	Flow	
The	first	crucial	information	in	an	Emergency	Relief	Operation	(ERO)	is	the	complete	assessment	
sheet	from	the	field	team,	providing	field	and	HQ	with	an	overview	of	the	needs	of	the	affected	
population.	If	the	sheet	is	not	completely	filled	in	because	the	assessor	does	not	understand	what	
is	 required	or	 the	data	 is	 simply	 not	 available	 (e.g.	 due	 to	problems	of	 humanitarian	 access),	
essential	 information	could	be	missing.	Often	merely	the	reading	of	the	demand	sheet	can	be	
one	of	the	biggest	sources	of	friction	 in	this	turbulent	nature	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.32).	Another	
effect	 generated	 by	 the	 combination	 of	 interacting	 causes	 is	 the	 bullwhip	 effect;	 the	 supply	
chain’s	 natural	 tendency	 to	 augment	 and	 delay	 demand	 orders	 (Forrester,	 1958;	 Sahin	 &	
Robinson.,	2002,	p.	514).		
Such	problems	can	cause	an	interruption,	or	an	impediment	to	information	flow.	The	literature	
mentions	numerous	causes	of	such	obstacles.	Table	2.3.4	gives	an	overview.	
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	 IMPEDIMENT	 EXPLANATION	 AUTHOR(S)	
	 Urgent	responsiveness	 Urgent	responsiveness	of	disaster	
environment	strain	IF	
Day	et	al.,	2009;		
Dolinskaya	et	al.,	2011;	
Kelly,	1995;		
Seybolt,	2009;		
Van	Wassenhove,	2006	
Extreme	uncertainty	 Crucial	Information	about	relief	item	
such	as	time,	place,	type	of	product,	
quantity,	and	potential	supply	sources	
may	not	be	known	
Balcik	et	al.,	2009;		
Day	et	al.,	2009;		
Seybolt,	2009;	
Van	Wassenhove,	2006	
Short	supply	chain	life-cycle	 Processes	are	rapidly	created	and	
modified	with	little	time	to	formalize	
associated	information	flows	
Day	et	al.,	2009;		
Denning,	2006	
Complex	environment	 Complexity	and	chaotic	nature		 Van	Wassenhove,	2006	
Many	stakeholders	&	
demands		
Donors	are	influential	and	request	
greater	donor	accountability	and	
transparency	
Balcik	et	al.,	2009;		
Dolinskaya	et	al.,	2011;	
Van	Wassenhove,	2006	
Inaccessibility	 Physical	non-availability:	information	
systems	were	unprepared	or	broke	
down	
Day	et	al.,	2009	
Unreliability	 The	organisation’s	low	level	of	
confidence	in	data	or	information	it	
possesses	
Day	et	al.,	2009	
	 No	standards	 Individual	solutions	to	share	
information	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Lack	of	sense	of	ownership	
for	decisions	
Ambiguity;	people	do	not	take	
responsibility	for	decisions	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Roles	and	Responsibilities	
are	not	clear	
Ambiguity;	people	do	not	take	
responsibility	for	tasks	as	their	role	is	
unclear	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Lack	of	process	knowledge	 Uncertainty	about	who	to	involve	in	IS	 Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Low	information	priority	 Not	placing	appropriate	precedence	
on	IS	
Day	et	al.,	2009	
Source	identification	
difficulty	
Not	knowing	where	to	obtain	
information/no	access	
Day	et	al.,	2009	
	 Inadequate	stream	of	
information	
Shortage	or	overload	of	information	 Day	et	al.,	2009	
Storage	media	misalignment	 Storage	constrains	efficient	IS	 Day	et	al.,	2009	
Inconsistent	data	and	
information	formats	
Different	dimensional	or	field	
definitions.	“Playing	safe”	->	take	the	
highest	number	to	be	sure	
Day	et	al.,	2009	
Online	system	not	being	
used	much		
Data	in	online	system	not	up	to	date,	
fragmented	&	stored	in	too	many	
places	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
	 Overworked	staff	&	no	time	
for	information	sharing	
Lack	of	importance	on	reporting	leads	
to	too	many	projects	and	IS	suffers	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Info	access	depends	on	
interpersonal	relationships	
Uncertainty	leads	to	unofficial	
channels	of	communication	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
HQ	does	not	understand	the	
field	
Too	far	from	field	reality,	information	
is	not	transferred	due	to	lack	of	
understanding	
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Table	2.3.4:	Impediments	to	information	flow	in	literature	(page	1/2).	
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	 High	Staff	turnover	 Not	all	information	is	transmitted	
when	staff	leave	and	are	replaced		
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press;	
Van	Wassenhove,	2006	
Lack	of	skilled	logistics	
worker	
Unskilled	staff	do	not	realize	the	
importance	of	their	IS	
Akhtar	et	al.,	2012	
Coordination	costs	
	
Smaller	INGOs	cannot	afford	the	
additional	costs	like	traveling	to	
meetings	->	less	IS	quality	
Akhtar	et	al.,	2012;	
Balcik	et	al.,	2009	
Cultural	conflicts	 Different	ways	of	working,	living	and	
thinking	create	conflicts	and	impede	
transfer	of	exact	message	
Akhtar	et	al.,	2012;		
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Not	everyone	is	in	the	
information	loop	
Exclusions	lead	to	not	having	the	
specific	information		
Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	
press	
Table	2.3.4:	Impediments	to	information	flow	in	literature	(page	2/2).	
Many	of	these	impediments	are	due	to	failing	or	incomplete	processes.	If	complete,	installed	and	
observed	by	everyone,	many	obstacle	could	be	dispelled.	The	next	subsection	examines	the	effect	
of	improved	processes	on	these	impediments.	
2.3.5 Process	Management	
Improvement	of	information	flow	can	be	done	through	process	management.	A	variety	of	tools	
and	techniques	support	process	management	and	improvement,	most	of	them	come	from	the	
commercial	 sector	 (Tatham	 &	 Christopher,	 2014,	 p.	 22)	 and	 include	 approaches	 like	 lean	
management	and	Total	Quality	Management	(TQM1).	Lean	is	a	methodology	for	the	reduction	of	
waste	 and	 produces	 better	 performance	 with	 existing	 resources.	 For	 example,	 World	 Vision	
applied	a	 lean	six	sigma	approach	for	process	 improvement	in	Eastern	Africa	and	showed	that	
TQM	 approaches	 also	 apply	 to	 INGOs	 (Parris,	 2013).	 World	 Vision’s	 goal	 was	 to	 get	 better	
outcomes	for	existing	funds,	staff	and	other	resources	(Tatham	&	Christopher,	2014,	p.	22).	The	
understanding	 and	 application	 of	 TQM	 concepts	 and	 tools	 reduced	 the	 average	 time	 for	
procurement	and	recruitment	by	40-80	percent	and	the	annual	expenses	by	one	million	dollars	
(Parris,	2013,	p.	458).		
Bartell,	Haselkorn,	Kemp	and	Lappenbusch	 (2006,	p.	157ff)	 realized	 that	effective	 information	
sharing	is	becoming	increasingly	fundamental	to	the	humanitarian	relief	sector	and	propose	the	
production	 of	 new	 knowledge	 in	 a	 more	 complete	 process	 map	 of	 emergency	 response	
																																								 																				
1	Total	Quality	Management	is	a	management	approach	aiming	at	increasing	business	and	reducing	losses	
due	to	wasteful	practices.	Management	and	employees	are	 involved	 in	the	continuous	 improvement	of	
processes,	products,	services	and	the	culture	in	which	they	work	(Hashmi,	2017).	
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information	flow.	A	process	map	or	a	value	stream	map	is	another	lean	management	method	for	
analysis	and	design	of	sequences	of	a	product	or	a	service	(Bartell	et	al.,	2006,	p.	160;	Tatham	&	
Christopher,	2014,	p.31).	Value	stream	mapping	resumes	all	actions	required	to	bring	a	product	
or	a	service	through	the	essential	flows	(Rother	&	Shook,	1999,	p.	3).	It	principally	is	a	pencil	and	
paper	tool	providing	understanding	about	the	flow	of	material	and	information	as	a	product	or	
service	makes	its	way	through	the	value	stream	(Rother	&	Shook,	1999,	p.	4).	The	information	
flow	thereby	is	as	important	as	the	material	flow	as	it	tells	each	process	what	to	do	next	(Rother	
&	 Shook,	 1999,	 p.	 5).	 It	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 communication,	 business	 planning	 or	 change	
management	tool	(Rother	&	Shook,	1999,	p.	9).	 	
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3 Method	Design		
Methods	explain	the	“what	is	meant”	and	the	“how	it	is	known”.	The	subsequent	section	gives	
answers	to	the	following	questions:	
- What	was	the	approach	to	the	research?	
- Which	theoretical	model	was	used?	
- Which	techniques	where	employed?	
The	section	also	explains	why	it	was	chosen	to	use	these	methods,	model	and	techniques.			
3.1 Approach	to	Research	
For	 this	 research,	 a	 qualitative	 approach	 is	 chosen.	 Humanitarian	 operations	 and	 disaster	
research	have	not	 received	 significant	 theoretical	 and	practical	 research	attention	 (Day	et	al.,	
2009;	Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	 in	press).	The	phenomenon	of	rapid-onset	natural	disasters	 finds	
itself	in	a	complex	and	extreme	environment,	where	its	impact	upon	environment	and	people	is	
considered	to	be	dramatic	while	somewhat	unpredictable	(Day	et	al.,	2009,	p.	640).	Qualitative	
methods	provide	the	advantage	of	flexibility	for	investigating	the	uniqueness	of	a	specific	case,	
the	emergence	of	new	themes	(Eisenhardt,	1989,	p.	539)	and	a	continuous	view	of	change	which	
is	inherent	to	humanitarian	crisis.	Also,	some	aspects	of	a	phenomenon	may	not	be	fully	exploited	
at	the	beginning	of	the	inquiry	(Day	et	al.	2009,	p.	640).	The	qualitative	approach	is	therefore	very	
suitable	to	explore	the	subject	of	information	flow	in	a	rapidly	changing	environment.		
This	 thesis	 was	 developed	 in	 an	 approach	 in	 five	 steps.	 First,	 the	 literature	 on	 humanitarian	
operations	 and	 information	 flow	 was	 screened.	 Second,	 the	 identified	 impediments	 to	
information	flow	were	gathered	and	analysed.	Next,	the	interview,	questionnaire	as	well	as	the	
process	mapping	 was	 designed	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 impediments.	 The	 data	 collection	
(conduction	 of	 interviews	 and	 process	 mapping	 and	 sending	 out	 the	 questionnaire)	 was	
completed	in	step	four.	This	paper	uses	a	combination	of	process	and	value	stream	mapping	to	
map	the	information	flow	and	find	the	impediments	and	the	corresponding	improvements.	In	last	
step,	 the	evaluation	and	 the	 concrete	 recommendations	 for	 action	were	developed	and	 then	
translated	into	a	booklet.		
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Figure	3.1:	Approach	in	five	steps.	
Step	1	–	Screening	of	literature	and	first	discussions	with	experts	
Through	a	broad	analysis	of	 literature,	more	than	60	relevant	sources	could	be	identified.	The	
literature	was	reviewed	and	impediments	to	information	flow	in	the	humanitarian	context	were	
identified.	At	the	same	time,	discussions	with	experts	were	conducted	in	phone	calls	to	scope	the	
subject.	This	enabled	proximity	to	reality	on	the	ground	and	flexibility	with	associated	themes.	
The	 objective	 is	 to	 build	 on	 a	 solid	 theoretical	 foundation	 as	well	 as	 to	 ensure	 the	 outcome	
suitability	for	daily	use.		
Step	2	–	Gathering	and	analysis	of	different	impediments		
The	vast	literature	needed	to	be	systematized	into	different	topics	(characteristics	of	emergency	
relief,	humanitarian	logistics	and	information	flow).	Then,	all	similar	impediments	to	IF	identified	
in	the	literature	were	gathered	under	the	same	generic	term.	Authors	were	listed.	Then,	these	
obstacles	to	information	flow	were	analysed	and	a	description	was	formulated	for	each	(used	in	
table	2.3.4	and	in	the	questionnaire).	
Step	3	–	Development	of	interview,	questionnaire	and	process	mapping	
In	step	three,	 interview	questions	were	 formulated	and	the	questionnaire	 is	derived	 from	the	
impediments	detected	in	literature.	The	interviews	were	conducted	to	understand	encountered	
problems	on	the	ground.	The	questionnaire	listed	the	identified	impediments	to	IF	and	asked	the	
experts	how	frequently	they	experienced	this	obstacle.	The	process	mapping	was	designed	with	
the	help	of	the	questionnaire	results	and	the	advice	from	Medair’s	process	excellence	expert.	The	
•Screening of	literature	and	first	
discussions	with	experts1
•Gathering	and	analysis	of	
different	impediments2
•Development of	interview,	
questionnaire	and	process	mapping3
•Conduction of	interviews	and	process	mapping	
and	sending	out	questionnaire4
•Evaluation	and	deduction	of	
recommendations	for	action,	
translation	into	booklet
5
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internal	 evaluation,	 the	 lessons	 learnt	 and	 new	 strategic	 decisions	 in	 reaction	 to	 Hurricane	
Matthew	 were	 discussed	 in	 direct	 communication	 with	Medair’s	 Emergency	 Response	 Team	
(ERT)	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 circumstances	 at	 Medair	 before	 the	 process	 mapping	 was	
conducted.		
Step	4	–	Conduction	of	interviews,	process	mapping	and	sending	out	questionnaire	
Following	 the	 first	discussions	 in	 step	one,	 four	 semi-structured	 interviews	with	humanitarian	
experts	 working	 in	 three	 different	 INGOs	were	 conducted	 to	 elaborate	 the	 subject	 and	 seek	
confirmation	of	academic	topics.	The	interviews	also	provided	practical	tips	which	could	then	be	
incorporated	 in	the	booklet.	After	 the	 interviews	were	conducted,	 the	 focus	of	 the	thesis	was	
narrowed	down	and	the	questionnaire	was	adapted.	Subsequently,	the	questionnaire	was	sent	
out	 to	discover	 the	 frequency	 in	which	 the	participants	 experienced	 the	 impediments.	 It	 also	
provides	 an	 indication	 of	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	 individual	 problems	 on	 ground.	 Finally,	 the	
information	flow	process	mapping	with	Medair	was	conducted.	The	combination	of	process	and	
value	stream	mapping	allowed	a	concrete	look	of	the	material,	financial,	process	and	information	
flows	between	the	different	players	in	the	first	few	weeks	of	the	Hurricane	Matthew	response.		
Step	5	–	Evaluation	and	deduction	of	recommendations	for	action,	translation	into	booklet	
The	 results	 from	 the	 data	 collection	 were	 then	 documented	 and	 evaluated.	 The	 described	
material	and	 information	flows	 in	the	process	mapping	were	arranged	with	Post-it	notes	on	a	
poster.	During	the	process	discussion,	many	problems	were	diagnosed	and	some	improvement	
ideas	were	already	collected.	Then,	 results	were	documented	 (section	4.3)	and	 four	obstacles	
encountered	 in	 the	 case	of	Haiti	 are	discussed	 (section	4.4).	 Subsequently,	 recommendations	
were	formulated	with	process	specialists,	based	on	the	process	mapping	and	on	the	background	
of	the	interview	and	questionnaire	findings.	A	best-case	scenario	of	Haiti	was	designed.	After	the	
documentation	of	the	results,	the	impediments	were	discussed	and	merged	with	the	literature	
regarding	emergency	relief,	humanitarian	logistics	and	information	flow.	The	recommendations	
for	action	then	were	systematized	on	the	basis	of	the	conditions	of	behaviour-model.	By	means	
of	a	prioritisation	matrix,	three	recommendations	were	elaborated	in	detail	and	a	generalisation	
of	which	approach	to	improvement	could	work	for	which	recommendation	is	ventured.	Finally,	
the	 booklet	 is	 developed	 as	 a	 handy	 summary	 of	 recommendations	 and	 relevant	 topics	 for	
humanitarian	practitioners.	
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3.2 Theoretical	Model		
The	 theoretical	model	helped	categorize	 the	 recommendations	 for	 improvement	of	problems	
faced	in	information	sharing.		
In	most	cases,	information	is	shared	consciously	from	one	human	being	to	another.	Information	
flows	from	the	sender	through	a	channel	to	the	receiver	(basic	model	of	communication,	figure	
2.3.1).	The	modality	of	how	information	is	transmitted	depends	on	the	behaviour	of	two	persons	
and	 the	 channel	 used.	 Information	 sharing	 is	 therefore	 disassembled	 through	 Rosenstiel’s	
theoretical	 model	 conditions	 of	 behaviour,	 a	 model	 which	 analyses	 the	 prerequisites	 or	
conditions	contributing	to	human	behaviour	(that	is	sharing,	incomplete	sharing	or	no	sharing	of	
information).	The	 recommendations	are	categorised	 in	 this	model	 in	order	 to	understand	 the	
conditions	for	the	realisation	for	each	recommendation2.	Based	on	the	categorisation	 into	the	
four	conditions,	the	recommendations	can	be	drawn	from	that.		
	
Figure	3.2:	Model	conditions	of	behaviour	(Rosenstiel,	2010,	p.	348).	
When	it	comes	to	the	causes	of	human	behaviour,	Rosenstiel	and	Nerdinger	(2011)	differentiate	
between	volition	and	ability	of	 the	person	 involved,	meaning	 their	willingness	and	capacity	 to	
share	 information	 and	 empowerment	 and	 obligation	 of	 the	 situation,	 meaning	 the	 given	
organisational	norms	and	 regulations	on	 information	 sharing.	Situational	enabling	 is	 added	as	
																																								 																				
2	The	impediments	to	IF	could	have	been	categorised	into	the	model	also.	This	would	have	enabled	the	
comprehension	 of	 the	 roots	 of	 these	 impediments.	 However,	 since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
recommendations	to	these	impediments	was	done	based	on	the	research	and	not	based	on	the	model,	the	
categorisation	of	impediments	into	the	four	conditions	is	not	an	additional	benefit.	
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fourth	 condition,	 describing	 the	 circumstantial	 impeding	 or	 enabling	 factors	 to	 information	
sharing	 (Rosenstiel,	 2010,	 p.	 347).	 Rosenstiel	 (2010,	 p.	 347)	 suggests	 asking	 four	 questions	
whenever	an	employee’s	behaviour	does	not	meet	the	expectations:	
- “Was	he	not	able	to	do	it?		
- Did	he	not	want	to	do	it?		
- Was	he	not	allowed	to	do	it?		
- Did	he	not	have	the	necessary	resources	or	were	there	impeding	barriers?”	(Rosenstiel,	
2010,	p.	347).	
These	four	conditions	influence	each	other	and	most	importantly	have	an	effect	on	the	behaviour	
of	a	person.	When	recommendations	for	the	improvement	of	information	flow	can	be	located	in	
one	of	the	four	conditions,	the	underlying	factors	can	be	identified	and	levers	for	action	may	be	
drawn.	Depending	on	the	condition,	the	lever	to	handle	the	improvement	is	of	a	different	nature	
and	extent.		
CONDITION	OF	
BEHAVIOUR	
QUESTION	 EXPLANATION	in	
regards	to	IF	
DEPENDING	ON		 LEVER	TO	SOLVE	
THIS	
Individual	skills	 Would	the	
personal	abilities	
and	skills	enable	
the	person	to	
act?	
Being	able	to	do	
something,	by	a	
specific	nature,	
circumstances	or	
entitlement	
Skills	and	methods	
of	communication	
and	project	
management	
Training	
Individual	desire	 How	do	
motivation	and	
values	influence	
individual	action?	
Intent	and	will	to	
transfer	
information	to	
another	entity	
Intrinsic	and	
extrinsic	
motivation	
Difficult	to	
influence.	Maybe	
partly	with	HR-
incentives		
Empowerment	
and	obligation	
Do	norms	and	
regulations	allow	
a	specific	action?	
Have	the	
permission,	
legitimately	
entitled	and	
authorized	to	
share	information		
Management,	
incentive	systems	
Influenced	by	
managers	who	
take	decisions	on	
change		
Situational	
enabling	
Which	impeding	
or	favouring	
external	factors	
exist?	
Technical	issues	or	
situational	
enablers	or	
disablers	to	share	
information	in	a	
specific	setting	
Emergency	
setting,	technical	
infrastructure,	
security,	
circumstances	
Difficult	to	
influence	
Table	3.2:	Conditions	of	behaviour	(Rosenstiel,	2010)	adapted	to	information	flow.	
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3.3 Data	Collection	Techniques		
Information	flow	in	emergency	response	is	analysed	through	interviews,	a	questionnaire	and	a	
process	mapping.		
SECTION	 TECHNIQUES	
Literature	
review	
- Table	listing	impediments	according	to	theme	and	with	listing	of	different	authors	
writing	about	this	obstacle	
Research	 1) 1)	Semi-structured	interviews	looking	at	the	context	of	the	organisation	(4	p.)	
2) 2)	Questionnaire	asking	the	frequency	of	the	experienced	impediments	(10	p.)	
3) 3)	Process	mapping	(1	emergency	response	team)	
Discussion	 4) -	Categorizing	impediments	into	Rosenstiel’s	conditions	of	behaviour	model	
5) -	Prioritisation	matrix	to	choose	three	improvements	for	elaboration	
6) -	Booklet	summarizing	the	improvement	recommendations	and	ideas	from	the	
interviews	
Table	3.3a:	Overview	of	data	collection	techniques.	
Booklet:	 Subsequently,	 the	 solutions	 to	 these	 impediments	 shall	 be	 made	 accessible	 to	
practitioners	in	the	field	to	provide	models	for	improvement.	The	goal	is	to	give	practical	ideas	
on	how	to	better	communicate	in	difficult	situations.	The	learning	method	was	inquired	in	the	
interviews	in	order	to	propose	an	appropriate	format.	This	thesis	proposes	to	share	improvement	
recommendations	in	a	booklet.	
ORG.		 NO.	OF	
EMPLOYEES	
MAIN	TYPE	OF	
WORK	
NO.	OF	
RESPONDENTS	
FORM	OF	
PARTICIPATION		
FUNCTIONS	OF	
RESPONDENTS	
Medair	
INGO1	
1.200	 Shelter,	WASH	 7	 I,	Q,	PM	 ERM,	ERO,	IMO,	
LM,	LO		
MAF	
INGO2	
1.000	 Logistics,	
Telecommunications	
2	 I,	Q	 ERM	
ICRC	
INGO3	
	
>	5.000	 Security,	Health,	
Shelter,	
Humanitarian	Law	
1	 I,	Q	 LO	
INGO4	 n.s.	 n.s.	 1	 Q	 ERM	
Caritas	CH	
INGO5	
>	1.000	 Shelter	 1	 Q	 ERM	
SHA		
GO	
>	1.000	 WASH,	Shelter,	Cash	 1	 I,	Q	 ERM	
Notes:	 WASH-Water,	 Sanitation	 &	 Hygiene.	 Form	 of	 participation:	 I-Interview;	 Q-Questionnaire;	 PM-
Process	 Mapping.	 Functions	 of	 respondents:	 ERM-Emergency	 Response	 Manager;	 ERO-Emergency	
Response	Officer;	IMO-Information	Management	Officer;	INGO-International	NGO;	LM-Logistics	Manager;	
LO-Logistics	Officer	
Table	3.3b:	Overview	of	details	regarding	organisations	and	respondents.	
The	sample	consisted	of	five	small-	and	middle-sized	INGOs	and	one	governmental	organisation	
(GO),	with	 a	 total	 of	 13	 respondents.	 The	 participants	 originated	 from	different	 departments	
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within	 their	organisation	and	were	positioned	either	at	HQ	or	 in	 the	FO.	A	 total	of	 four	semi-
structured	 interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 a	 logistics	 manager,	 a	 logistics	 officer	 and	 two	
emergency	response	managers.	Ten	questionnaires	were	filled	out	by	six	emergency	response	
managers,	one	emergency	response	officer,	two	emergency	logistics	officer	and	one	information	
management	officer.	One	semi-structured	process	mapping	took	place	with	a	team	of	four	with	
INGO1	at	their	HQ	in	Switzerland.	
	
	
Figure	3.3c:	Functions	of	participants.		
Experts:	The	nature	of	the	study	required	to	select	interviewees	having	first-hand	experience	of	
the	humanitarian	response	to	Hurricane	Matthew	in	terms	of	information	flow	between	HQ	and	
FO.	The	experts	experienced	the	impediments	to	information	flow	and	can	hypothetically	think	
of	 what	 could	 improve	 information	 sharing	 during	 an	 interview.	 Participants	 who	 interfaced	
31%
61%
8%
Location	of	participants
HQ
FO
Field-HQ
54%
15%
7%
8%
8%
8%
Organisations
INGO1
INGO2
INGO3
INGO4
INGO5
GO
Logistics	Manager
8%
Logistics	Officer
23%
Emergency	Response	
Officer
15%
Emergency	Response	
Manager
46%
Information	
Management	Officer
8%
Functions	of	participants
Logistics	Manager
Logistics	Officer
Emergency	Response	Officer
Emergency	Response	Manager
Information	Management	Officer
Figure	3.3a:	Location	of	participants.	Field-HQ	is	a	
regional	headquarter	in	a	field	country.	
Figure	3.3b:	Participants	according	to	their	
organisation.	
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between	operational	and	strategic	 level	 to	capture	 the	reasons	behind	certain	decisions	were	
chosen.	In	addition,	participants	who	had	merely	operational	experience	were	also	interviewed	
in	order	to	receive	practically	applicable	ideas	on	the	format	how	to	share	information.		
3.3.1 Interviews	
Four	semi-structured	interviews	were	conducted	in	order	to	fathom	the	subject.	Each	interview	
lasted	from	40	to	60	minutes	and	was	done	face	to	face,	via	skype	or	by	phone.	As	an	opening	
question	 in	 each	 interview,	 the	 participants	 were	 asked	 to	 reflect	 the	 structure	 of	 their	
organisation’s	 communication	 culture.	 Open-ended	 questions	 were	 asked	 to	 obtain	 their	
perspectives	on	 IF	 in	their	organisation	 in	five	areas:	organisational	structure,	communication,	
people	and	complexity	of	emergency	response.	These	questions	varied	from	one	organisation	to	
the	other	in	order	to	seek	the	problem	areas	of	information	flow.	Follow-up	questions	were	asked	
to	avoid	incomprehension	on	the	researcher’s	side.	In	closing,	the	interviewees	were	asked	about	
learning	methods	in	order	to	grasp	the	format	in	which	recommendations	shall	be	transferred.	
The	 interviews	were	 recorded	 and	 the	 transcription	 transferred	 to	 an	 interview	 results	 table	
(Appendix).	The	realization	of	the	vastness	of	this	subject	through	the	interviews	led	to	a	more	
concrete	approach.	The	time	limit	and	the	restriction	onto	the	relationship	HQ	to	FO	in	a	specific	
emergency	relief	operation	was	fixed	after	the	interviews	(for	the	process	mapping).	
3.3.2 Questionnaire	
The	questionnaire	was	then	filled	out	by	ten	different	experts	in	emergency	relief	who	operate	in	
both	sudden-onset,	slow-onset	and	man-made	and	natural	disasters.	The	goal	was	to	see	which	
impediments	found	in	the	literature	are	experienced	in	the	field.	In	the	first	part,	the	respondents	
were	asked	to	imagine	their	last	emergency	relief	operation	where	they	played	a	major	part	in	
and	state	their	function	and	experience.	The	second	part	consisted	of	five	groups,	including	each	
five	to	seven	impediments	to	information	flow.	These	impediments	were	found	in	literature	and	
similar	obstacles	were	classified	into	the	same	group.	The	respondents	were	asked	to	indicate	
the	frequency	(rarely,	sometimes,	often)	to	which	this	impediment	was	experienced	in	the	before	
mentioned	emergency	relief	operation.	
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1.	EMERGENCY	
SETTING	
2.	ORGANISATIO-
NAL	STRUCTURE	
3.	INFORMATION	
SYSTEMS	
4.	BEHAVIOR	 5.	ENVIRONMENT	
Urgent	
responsiveness		
Extreme	
uncertainty	
Short	supply	chain	
life-cycle		
Complex	
environment	
Many	
stakeholders	and	
demands	of	donor	
accountability	and	
transparency		
Inaccessibility		
Unreliability	
Structure		
Need	to	
standardise		
Lack	of	sense	of	
ownership	for	
decisions		
Roles	and	
responsibilities	
are	not	clear	
Lack	of	process	
knowledge		
Low	information	
priority		
Source	
Identification	
difficulty	
Inadequate	
stream	of	
information	
Storage	media	
misalignment		
Need	of	robust	
equipment		
Inconsistent	data	
and	information	
formats		
Online	system	not	
being	used	much	
Overworked	staff	
and	no	time	for	IS		
Info	access	
depends	on	
interpersonal	
relationship		
Language	barriers		
HQ	does	not	
understand	the	
field		
Unwillingness	
Staff	turnover	
(emergency	phase)		
High	staff	turnover	
(generally)		
Lack	of	skilled	
workers		
Coordination	costs		
Cultural	conflicts		
Not	everyone	is	in	
the	information	loop	
Table	3.3.2:	The	five	groups	listing	the	impediments	from	the	questionnaire.	
3.3.3 Process	Mapping	
Finally,	 the	 ERT	 of	 the	 middle-sized	 IHO	 Medair	 took	 part	 in	 the	 process	 mapping.	 The	
combination	 of	 a	 process	 and	 a	 value	 stream	 mapping	 consisted	 in	 a	 semi-structured	
conversation	and	lasted	120	minutes.	In	the	first	part,	the	participants	were	asked	to	give	details	
about	the	reasons	and	 improvement	possibilities	 for	the	 impediments	which	they	classified	as	
“often”	in	the	questionnaire	before.	In	the	second	and	main	part,	the	participants	were	requested	
to	map	the	process	of	the	first	weeks	of	the	humanitarian	response	to	Hurricane	Matthew.	The	
group	 session	 with	 INGO1	 was	 conducted	 with	 the	 emergency	 response	 manager,	 two	
emergency	 response	officers	 and	 the	 logistics	 officer.	 The	 actions	of	 different	 functions	were	
registered	 on	 separate	 horizontal	 lines.	 Money	 flows,	 information	 flows,	 material	 flows	 and	
process	flows	were	recorded	whilst	operational	project	steps,	documents	and	decisions	as	well	
as	logistic	tasks	counted	as	process	steps.		
Problems	became	apparent	and	were	marked	as	such	and	 improvement	 ideas	were	discussed	
and	 noted.	 The	 initial	 process	map	was	 complemented	 by	 a	 timeline	 and	 a	matching	 of	 the	
diagnostics	 with	 corresponding	 recommendations.	 Finally,	 these	 recommendations	 were	
incorporated	into	the	process	mapping,	which	resulted	in	an	adapted,	ideal	best-case	scenario	
process	map.	
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Figure	3.3.3:	Process	map	of	ERT	Medair	response	to	Hurricane	Matthew	in	Haiti.	
3.4 Data	Interpretation	Techniques	
The	interpretation	and	discussion	of	the	results	adheres	to	the	approach	of	Brinkmann	(2013),	
who	requires	a	careful	analytical	procedure.	In	the	results	section,	the	collected	data	is	described	
as	 they	 have	 been	 comprehended.	 Four	 impediments	 are	 extracted	 from	 the	 results	 of	 the	
interviews,	questionnaire	and	the	process	mapping.	The	mapping	including	the	discussion	with	
the	ERT	yielded	many	 inputs	 concerning	 impediments	and	 recommendations.	As	 the	ERT	had	
been	conducting	an	extensive	evaluation	and	had	already	been	thinking	about	improvements	in	
a	prior	workshop	together,	these	rich	and	reflected	inputs	were	suggested	during	the	mapping.	
For	 interpretation,	 a	 timeline	 was	 created	 after	 the	 mapping,	 in	 an	 overview	 depicting	 the	
difference	 between	 planned	 and	 actual	 response.	 Another	 figure	 confronted	 diagnostics	
(problems)	 to	 recommendations	 and	 corresponding	 pairs	 were	 connected.	 These	
recommendations	 result	 from	mapping,	 interviews,	 literature	and	 the	discussion	with	process	
experts.	 The	 specific	 data	 analysis	 formed	 a	 spiral	 around	 the	 four	 conditions	 of	 behaviour,	
consolidating	with	each	bend.	For	the	discussion	and	appreciation,	the	results	were	classified	in	
the	 three	 topics	 of	 the	 literature	 review.	 Then,	 the	 improvements	 were	 categorized	 into	
Rosenstiel’s	 conditions	 of	 behaviour	model	 and	 three	 of	 them	were	 elaborated.	 It	 should	 be	
mentioned	that	the	scheme	of	Rosenstiel	was	used	as	a	general	guideline	to	make	sense	of	the	
data	 while	 remaining	 alert	 for	 emerging	 themes.	 The	 categorization	was	 deemed	 helpful	 for	
identifying	the	context	and	the	improvements	for	IF.	 	
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4 Results	
This	section	presents	the	results	of	the	study.	First,	the	interviews	provide	the	understanding	of	
the	context	and	the	questionnaire	indicates	the	frequency	to	which	impediments	to	information	
flow	are	experienced	in	the	field.	Then,	the	outcomes	of	the	process	mapping	with	Medair	are	
presented	 with	 the	 initial	 process	 map	 and	 a	 timeline.	 Consequently,	 the	 impediments	 are	
summarized	under	four	topics:	decision	making,	time	difference,	shortage	of	funds	and	too	many	
variables.	Then,	the	impediments	from	the	mapping	are	compared	to	the	impediments	found	in	
literature.	Subsequently,	these	diagnostics	are	matched	with	corresponding	recommendations.	
The	 process	map	 is	 then	 adapted	 with	 the	 proposed	 improvements	 to	 a	 best-case	 scenario.	
Finally,	the	research	question	on	how	improvements	shall	be	shared	is	answered.	
4.1 Interviews	
In	each	of	the	four	semi-structured	interviews	different	questions	were	asked.	The	statements	
will	be	used	to	give	background	to	the	questionnaire	and	the	process	mapping.	The	most	common	
topics	were	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 (who	 is	 responsible	 for	 bringing	 into	 the	meeting	which	
information	 and	 who	 decides)	 and	 clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 (indicating	 who	 shares	
information	with	whom).	Some	of	the	significant	statements	shall	be	depicted	below.	
Organisational	
structure	
- In	 a	matrix	organisation,	 logistics	 is	 ‘only’	 a	 support	 function.	 Ideally,	 logistics	
should	be	involved	in	strategy.	
- Hiring	people	without	much	experience	and	assigning	them	responsible	roles	is	
a	problematic	state	at	our	organisation.	
- The	organisation	is	ready	for	change;	however,	money	is	the	limiting	factor.	
- Procurement	 in	Haiti	was	 difficult	 as	 no	 supplier	 could	 be	 found.	 In	 the	 end,	
suppliers	from	Dominican	Republic	were	used.	
Communication		 - We	do	not	have	an	information	management	system	including	information	from	
all	 departments.	We	 only	 use	 different	 small	 tools,	 but	 no	 all-encompassing,	
which	would	offer	steering	tools	for	managers,	among	other	useful	things.		
- Checklists	are	good,	however,	need	a	lot	of	training	which	is	costly.	
- Clear	lines	of	communication:	Only	the	head	of	crisis	at	HQ	and	team	leader	field	
exchange	information,	which	offers	a	clear	structure.		
- The	collaboration	with	partners	in	the	field	is	essential	for	successful	operations	
and	long-lasting	good	relationships.	
People	 - We	do	not	take	enough	time	for	training,	resulting	in	the	lack	of	skilled	workers.	
- The	local	and	expat	teams	complement	each	other:	Sometimes	the	locals	have	
no	technical	knowhow,	but	the	vital	cultural	understanding	for	collaboration.	
- The	decision	authority	is	at	HQ,	but	they	closely	work	with	the	head	of	field	and	
use	their	information	for	decisions.	
- Clarification	of	mandate	of	different	divisions	is	important.	
- We	deliver	the	desperately	needed	relief	items	first,	then	everything	else.	
Table	4.1:	Significant	statements	from	the	interviews	(page	1/2).	
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Improvement	
ideas	
- Too	 many	 people	 are	 in	 a	 meeting	 ->	 Clear	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 would	
simplify	discussions	and	decisions.	
- Inexperienced	 staff	 ->	 clear	 career	 development,	 introduction	of	 exams,	 Staff	
training	&	capacity	building	could	improve	the	technical	skills	of	staff.	
- No	 overview	 of	 operations	 ->	 more	 measurement	 and	 management	 skills	
needed	to	gain	overview	of	operational	performance.	
- Difficult	 collaboration	 within	 a	 matrix	 organisation	 ->	 find	 out	 how	 to	 work	
together	across	functions		
- Losing	time	through	non-use	of	satellite	communication	due	to	high	costs	->	use	
expensive	communication	tools	and	allocate	these	costs	in	funding	application	
proposals.	
Table	4.1:	Significant	statements	from	the	interviews	(page	2/2).	
For	INGO2,	an	air	transport	providing	organisation,	the	complex	environment	is	less	complicated:		
Normally,	a	large	number	of	stakeholders	and	their	demands	can	be	an	impediment	to	IF	(Van	
Wassenhove,	2006;	Day	et	al.,	2012;	Tatham	&	Spens,	2011).	However,	MAF	works	as	a	service	
provider	in	telecommunications	and	transport	and	sees	their	task	to	serve	in	networking	this	large	
number	of	stakeholders.	Through	networking,	information	is	received	and	the	organisation	is	able	
to	react	and	provide	air	transport.	Due	to	their	profession	as	pilots,	the	staff	are	used	to	work	
according	to	checklists	and	follow	them	accurately.	As	their	service	consists	in	networking	and	
providing	transport	for	often	the	same	NGOs,	some	structures	appear	to	be	clearer	than	they	are	
for	IHOs	providing	humanitarian	relief	in	completely	unknown	territory	to	unknown	beneficiary	
groups.	Also,	many	pilots	have	been	working	for	the	same	organisation	and	often	in	the	same	
place	for	a	long	time	which	simplified	information	flow	based	on	these	established	structures.		
Due	to	the	fact	that	“disasters	are	very	different,	and	one	to	the	other	 is	not	comparable”	(F.	
Jörimann,	 personal	 communication,	 April	 25,	 2017),	 the	 aforementioned	 statements	 and	
improvement	ideas	are	specific	to	the	according	organisation	and	are	not	easily	generalizable.		
4.2 Questionnaire	
The	participants	were	asked	in	the	questionnaire	to	which	extent	(rarely,	sometimes	or	often)	the	
listed	 impediments	 were	 experienced	 to	 be	 an	 obstacle	 to	 information	 flow	 in	 their	 chosen	
emergency	 operation.	 Ten	 relief	 experts	 from	 both	 HQ	 and	 field	 offices	 provided	 their	
experiences.	Where	 added	 comments	 were	 unclear,	 further	 inquiry	 via	 phone	 or	 email	 gave	
understanding	 concerning	 the	 causes	 for	 problems	 and	 their	 ideas	 for	 improvement.	 These	
further	explanations	were	added	under	“Why	and	where	was	this	a	problem?”	and	“What	was	
good?	/	 Improvements?”.	Most	 frequently	mentioned	answers	 (six	or	more)	are	circled	 (table	
4.2).		 	
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Table	4.2:	Questionnaire	results	and	comments	from	further	inquiry	(page	1/2).		
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Table	4.2:	Questionnaire	results	and	comments	from	further	inquiry	(page	2/2).	
In	the	following,	each	of	the	five	group	is	discussed	in	regards	to	the	roots	of	the	problem	and	
the	improvement	ideas.	
Emergency	 setting:	 Where	 security	 issues	 and	 bad	 or	 inexistent	 infrastructure	 hinder	 the	
organisation	to	perform	distributions	easily,	and	too	many	suppliers	and	locations	complicate	the	
operation,	 the	 organisation	 would	 reduce	 the	 size	 of	 the	 project	 next	 time.	 Sometimes	 the	
transfer	of	 information	 is	physically	not	possible.	There,	a	well-managed	cloud	server	and	 the	
conscious	management	of	consistent	and	informative	communication	could	reduce	gaps.	Where	
stakeholders	are	too	many	and	demands	from	donor	accountability	are	high,	clear	structures	can	
help.	The	strong	vote	for	unreliability	(sometimes	 in	six	out	of	ten)	of	 information	is	observed.	
The	problem	 there	 lied	 in	uncertainty	 about	 the	 initially	 shared	 information,	which	made	 the	
planning	insecure.	
Organisational	 structure:	 When	 logistics	 is	 set	 as	 an	 advisor	 function	 (instead	 of	 a	 support	
function),	they	are	able	to	assist	with	their	expertise	along	the	whole	supply	chain	which	enables	
evidence-based	activities,	instead	of	only	partial	intervention	without	planning.	The	definition	of	
roles	and	responsibility	as	well	as	the	ownership	for	decisions	came	up	as	one	of	the	major	time-
wasters.	 Instead,	definition	of	 final	 authority	and	clear	 lines	of	 communication	could	 improve	
decision	making	 and	 the	 understanding	 of	 roles	 and	 responsibilities.	 The	majority	 considered	
roles	and	responsibility	not	being	clear	(sometimes	in	six	out	of	ten).	If	a	person	is	unsure	about	
his	or	her	responsibilities,	logically	the	IS	will	not	be	congruent	with	the	role.		
Information	systems:	Major	problems	were	the	constant	adaptation	of	numbers	by	the	field	team	
and	the	use	of	different	recording	sheets	by	various	distribution	leaders.	This	lead	to	confusion	
at	HQ	as	the	adaptation	of	numbers	could	not	be	comprehended	and	the	different	sheets	did	not	
assure	the	assessment	of	the	same	data,	which	was	difficult	for	other	departments.	Therefore,	
with	standardised	forms,	the	organisation	could	ensure	the	transfer	of	all	relevant	information.	
In	order	to	prevent	the	field	team	from	adapting	their	assessment	numbers,	setting	one	project	
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block	is	suggested,	so	that	the	field	team	would	finish	that	project	and	if	the	numbers	needed	to	
be	corrected,	they	could	start	a	second	project	block.	
Behaviour:	Wrong	assessment	of	security	issues	from	HQ	side	led	to	unfounded	concern	for	the	
field	team.	The	difference	of	information	from	HQ	and	from	the	field	appeared	to	be	important.	
Calling	 a	 security	 advisor	 for	 his	 opinion	 in	 this	 situation	 could	 be	 a	 first	 option.	 Also,	 direct	
conversations	within	a	structured	communication	reasoning	scheme	could	be	a	starting	point	for	
other	incidences.	Such	a	scheme	would	define	a	structure	where	the	security	worries	have	to	be	
well	argued.	
Environment:	 The	 high	 staff	 turnover	 impacts	 projects	 negatively,	 as	 due	 to	 incomplete	 or	
inexistent	 handovers,	 much	 information	 is	 lost.	 Also,	 the	 lack	 of	 experience	 and	 working	
knowledge	 can	 be	 compensated	 through	 the	 establishment	 and	 communication	 of	 standard	
operation	procedures.	 Lack	of	 connection	between	 the	departments	can	be	 restored	 through	
mutual	understanding	and	adaption	of	interface	processes.	Many	of	these	interpersonal	issues	
are	connected	with	sensitivity	and	empathy	on	both	sides.	
The	questionnaires	filled	out	by	the	ERT	were	discussed	during	the	subsequent	process	mapping	
in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 background	 of	 the	 judgements.	 The	 following	 section	 shows	 the	
results	from	the	process	mapping.	
4.3 Process	Mapping	
The	process	mapping	was	done	with	 the	 emergency	 response	 team	of	Medair,	 a	 Switzerland	
based	international	relief	and	recovery	organisation.	In	order	to	learn	from	an	example,	the	most	
recent	 disaster	 was	 chosen:	 their	 emergency	 relief	 response	 to	 Haiti	 in	 October	 2016	 after	
Hurricane	Matthew.	 The	 hurricane	 destroyed	whole	 landscapes	 and	 the	 strong	winds	 caused	
extensive	 flooding	 and	 mudslides	 and	 left	 1.4	 million	 people	 in	 need	 of	 humanitarian	 aid	
(Reliefweb,	2016).	Medair	reacted	quickly	and	sent	a	logistician	to	Port-au-Prince	within	24	hours	
after	the	hurricane	made	landfall.	Two	days	later,	the	first	wave	(ERT)	arrived	to	conduct	an	assess	
and	assist	operation	in	the	first	week.	After	information	was	gathered,	the	team	distributed	the	
first	300	relief	 items.	At	the	same	time,	procurement	and	project	planning	kicked	in.	This	took	
longer	than	expected	and	on	the	25th	day	after	the	hurricane	passed,	the	quick	impact	project	
was	conducted	by	the	second	wave	(the	first	ERT	was	replaced	by	a	second	ERT).	Handover	to	
programs	and	reporting	followed.	The	initial	process	mapping	was	done	together	with	the	HQ-
based	ERT	officers,	the	field-based	emergency	response	manager	and	the	first	logistics	officer.		
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4.3.1 Initial	Process	Map	
Already	before	the	Haiti	response,	Medair	already	worked	on	a	flowchart	indicating	the	different	
steps	in	a	disaster	response.	This	chart	is	an	overview	of	all	tasks	and	activities	taken	by	several	
departments	during	an	emergency.	The	 initial	process	mapping	 for	 the	 research	of	 this	 thesis	
took	especially	the	first	and	second	ERT	(wave	one	and	two)	into	focus,	whereby	
the	Medair	processes	defined	on	 the	 flowchart	 (critical	paths)	were	 integrated.	
The	process	mapping	looked	at	the	flows	in	between	these	tasks	and	activities	and	
asked	what	kind	of	information	flowed	and	from	whom	to	whom.	The	focus	was	
placed	on	information	flow	and	the	encountered	problems	(impediments).	In	the	
process	mapping,	 different	 colours	 are	used	 to	distinguish	 information,	 process,	material	 and	
money	flows.	13	impediments	were	identified	during	the	team	discussion.	The	subsequent	pages	
show	the	process	of	the	first	ten	weeks	of	the	Medair	response.	
Timeline:	After	 the	mapping,	 a	 timeline	 is	 added	 to	 demonstrate	 the	difference	between	 the	
planned	emergency	 response	procedure	of	 the	organisation	and	 the	actual	mission	 in	Haiti	 in	
2016.	The	planned	procedure	times	are	drawn	from	internal	Medair	documentation	(emergency	
deployment	cycle).	A	drastic	time	delay	can	be	observed	in	the	Quick	Impact	Project	(QIP)	and	in	
the	in-depth	assessment	and	relief	program.	
	 38	
	
Figure	4.3.1:	Initial	process	mapping	with	Medair	ERT	on	the	emergency	response	to	Hurricane	Matthew	in	Haiti,	
October	2016	(page	1/2).	
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Figure	4.3.1:	Initial	process	mapping	with	Medair	ERT	on	the	emergency	response	to	Hurricane	Matthew	in	Haiti,	
October	2016	(page	2/2).	
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Figure	4.3.2:	Timeline	of	the	emergency	response;	planned	(green)	and	actual	(orange)	(page	1/2).	
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Figure	4.3.2:	Timeline	of	the	emergency	response;	planned	(green)	and	actual	(orange)	(page	2/2).	
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4.3.2 Timeline	
The	 development	 of	 ideas	 for	 the	 timeline	 as	 well	 as	 the	 diagnostics	 and	 recommendations	
(section	4.6)	resulted	from	a	discussion	with	two	process	experts	after	the	process	mapping.	The	
timeline	illustrates	the	difference	between	the	planned	and	the	actual	emergency	relief	operation	
in	relation	to	time	lapsed.	The	horizontal	axis	shows	the	time	lapsed	in	weeks.	The	vertical	axis	
lists	the	various	project	steps	in	an	emergency	relief	operation	taken	by	the	ERT	until	the	project	
was	handed	over	to	the	programs	department	(according	to	the	Medair	emergency	deployment	
cycle).	Below	in	the	green	and	orange	boxes,	the	different	waves	of	staff	deployed	can	be	seen.	
The	green	line	shows	the	planned	intervention	steps	in	the	emergency	deployment	cycle3.	The	
orange	line	shows	the	actual	steps	in	the	Haiti	operation.		
It	is	observed	that	the	first	relief	distribution	(assess	and	assist)	happened	timely	in	the	first	week.	
After	 that	 however,	 the	 procurement	 took	much	more	 time	 than	 planned.	 The	Quick	 Impact	
Project	(QIP)	was	planned	to	happen	from	day	7	to	day	21.	Instead,	the	team	used	the	time	from	
day	9	to	day	25	for	procurement	and	organisation	of	transport.	Due	to	security	reasons	and	the	
non-existence	of	roads,	ships	had	to	be	organised,	which	took	more	time	as	planned.	Then,	the	
QIP	started	on	day	25	and	ended	on	day	91	after	the	hurricane	struck	Haiti.	The	timeline	shows	a	
time	discrepancy	in	the	starting	date	(18	days)	and	in	the	duration	of	the	QIP	(14	days	planned	
versus	66	days	actual).	Consequently,	the	in-depth	assessment	and	relief	program	(distribution	of	
additional	 parts	 as	 well	 as	 new	 items)	 started	 39	 days	 later,	 and	 the	 duration	 was	 24	 days	
(compared	to	21	days	planned).	The	time	lag	could	not	be	caught	up,	but	the	difference	in	the	
duration	of	the	in-depth	assessment	and	relief	program	is	not	essential.		
However,	the	discrepancy	of	the	starting	date	of	QIP	as	well	as	its	duration	in	time	is	major.	This	
looks	 like	 being	 the	 effects	 of	 a	 bullwhip	 effect,	 the	 supply	 chain’s	 natural	 tendency	 to	 delay	
orders.	When	looking	at	the	reasons	for	this	discrepancy,	the	team	listed	many	causal	factors.	
The	next	section	looks	at	these	factors.		
																																								 																				
3	It	should	be	mentioned	that	the	ER	concept	expects	three	activities	to	be	conducted	in	the	first	three	to	
four	weeks:	 Assessment,	 the	QIP	 as	well	 as	 keeping	 donor	 relations	 on	 track.	 It	 is	 not	 specified	when	
assessment	should	end	and	QIP	begin	as	it	is	a	fluent	transition.	Therefore,	a	timely	implementation	in	the	
first	three	weeks	is	less	important.	Nonetheless,	the	QIP	is	an	ideal	levelling	board	to	see	the	problems	in	
relation	to	time.		
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4.4 What	were	the	Impediments	to	Information	Flow	in	the	Case	of	Haiti?	
The	 subsequent	 section	 discusses	 four	 major	 obstacles	 encountered	 in	 the	 interview,	 the	
questionnaire	and	 the	process	mapping.	 It	 resumes	 the	answers	 from	different	organisations,	
whereas	the	focus	is	on	Medair.	
4.4.1 Decision	Making	
In	the	process	mapping	it	is	observed	that	not	knowing	who	has	the	decision	power	slowed	the	
process	down;	consulting	the	whole	field	team	and	HQ	for	their	opinion	prolonged	the	process	
and	in	the	end,	it	took	the	team	leader	three	days	to	decide	on	the	base	location	and	operation	
locations.	The	organisation	underlines	participatory	decision	making	and	still,	the	main	decision	
maker	often	remains	unclear.	This	slows	the	process	down	and	the	confusion	about	who	takes	
which	decision	is	predestined.		
4.4.2 Time	Difference	
The	time	difference	appeared	to	be	a	central	problem	for	Medair	and	for	the	Swiss	Humanitarian	
Aid	Unit	 (SHA,	 the	humanitarian	arm	of	 the	Swiss	Agency	 for	Development	and	Cooperation).	
Haiti	being	seven	hours	behind	Swiss	time	meant	that	HQ	decided	at	the	end	of	their	working	day	
about	next	plans	and	strategies.	Subsequently,	 the	 teams	 in	Haiti	would	start	 their	work.	This	
implied	a	fast	communication	from	HQ	to	the	field.	Medair	struggled	to	communicate	efficiently.	
The	field	office	did	not	see	the	changes	in	plan	and	thus	worked	on	out-dated	information	while	
HQ	decided	already	to	change	plans.	The	SHA	realized	the	problem	in	early	stages	and	installed	a	
reporting	system	which	enabled	the	field	team	to	receive	the	responses	to	their	requests	just	on	
time	to	start	the	next	working	day.		
4.4.3 Shortage	of	Funds	
In	this	specific	case,	logistics	and	ERT	found	that	the	feeling	of	not	having	enough	funds	limited	
many	 project	 initiatives.	 Not	 having	 the	 clearance	 to	 spend	 higher	 amounts	 prevented	
international	procurement	in	the	first	few	days.	It	also	meant	people	were	aware	of	the	limits,	
afraid	to	spend	too	much	money	and	thus	did	not	use	satellite	communication	very	often.	As	a	
consequence,	crucial	information	was	sometimes	withheld	and	shared	later	on.	When	discussing	
the	mapping,	Medair’s	process	excellence	expert	said	that	there	has	always	been	enough	funding	
for	sudden-onset	disasters	 in	 the	end	 (A.	Parris,	personal	communication,	April	24,	2017).	For	
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protracted	 crisis	 and	 long-lasting	 emergencies,	 it	 is	 true	 that	 resources	 are	 very	 limited.	
Somehow,	 this	 fear	 of	 not	 having	 enough	 finances	 overlapped	 from	 longer	 emergencies	 to	
emergency	relief.	The	knowledge	that	for	rapid-onset	emergency	relief	there	is	always	enough	
funding	 could	 change	 the	 perception	 and	 the	way	 head	 of	 departments	 and	 teams	 plan	 and	
procure	 relief	 items.	 This	 thought	 could	 go	 even	 further:	 the	 emergency	 team	 leader	 could	
receive	from	the	fundraising	team	leader	the	average	amount	of	finances	his	department	would	
fundraise	in	this	type	of	emergency	after	a	certain	period	of	time	(B.	Thakur-Weigold,	personal	
communication,	April	24,	2017).	Thus,	the	emergency	team	leader	would	be	bolder	in	planning	
and	procuring.	Consequently,	the	FO	would	not	have	a	mindset	of	inappropriate	frugality	(fear	of	
causing	 big	 costs)	 when	 using	 satellite	 communication	 in	 remote	 areas,	 instead	 they	 would	
communicate	their	assessed	information	as	soon	as	possible.	
The	finances	for	governmental	units	are	not	as	tight	as	for	some	INGOs.	Still,	the	reporting	is	also	
done	 thoroughly	 due	 to	 the	 taxpayer	 who	 wants	 to	 know	 how	 his	 taxes	 are	 used.	 But	 the	
availability	of	enough	funding	enables	the	organisation	to	plan	many	of	trainings	and	choose	well	
qualified	staff.	Having	enough	experienced	staff	can	represent	quite	a	challenge	for	smaller	and	
middle-sized	INGOs.	
4.4.4 Too	many	Variables	
The	operation	 in	Haiti	was	overly	complex.	Medair	chose	three	suppliers	of	hygiene	kits	 to	be	
distributed	in	fifteen	locations	based	in	regions	hardly	accessible.	The	staff	changed	every	two	to	
three	weeks	and	they	had	different	levels	of	experience.	The	team	leaders	used	different	(or	no)	
reporting	 forms	 at	 distributions,	 which	 complicated	 the	 reporting	 of	 evidence.	 Some	 staff	
constantly	adapted	the	numbers	of	beneficiaries	of	relief	items	required,	which	was	not	passed	
on	 to	 all	 concerned	 departments	 at	 HQ.	 One	 of	 the	major	 learning	 from	 that	 operation	was	
obvious	for	the	team:	set	one	project	block	and	stick	with	it,	conduct	proper	handovers	and	do	
not	deploy	new	relief	workers	for	emergency	relief.	The	logistics	manager	added	in	the	interview	
the	thought	of	introducing	exams	for	staff	in	order	to	increase	project	quality	(K.	Hoeve,	personal	
communication,	March	2,	2017).	However,	 this	raises	the	question	 if	 the	 IHO	can	find	enough	
experienced	staff.	
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4.5 Literature	Impediments	Compared	to	Process	Mapping	Impediments	
When	comparing	 the	 impediments	 from	the	 literature	 review	to	 those	yielded	by	 the	process	
mapping,	it	is	observed	that	eight	out	of	thirteen	can	be	considered	as	somewhat	similar	to	the	
literature	findings	(check	section	3.3.2	or	4.2).	The	following	list	attributes	the	research	findings	
to	the	literature	findings:	
- No	communication	between	ELT,	ERT	and	M&R	deals	in	some	ways	with	the	organisational	
structure,	even	if	it	is	not	about	being	centralized/decentralized,	but	rather	the	structure	of	
how	decisions	are	made	and	the	lines	of	communication.	
- Security	 worries	 from	 HQ	 were	 unfounded,	 so	 it	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	 HQ	 does	 not	
understand	the	field.	
- Roles	and	responsibility	issues	are	found	in	both	literature	and	process	mapping.	
- Fear	of	causing	big	costs	when	using	satellite	communication	could	come	under	the	umbrella	
of	coordination	costs,	meaning	additional	communication	costs.	
- Adapting	 numbers	 results	 in	 information	 unreliability	as	 the	 organisation	 cannot	 trust	 its	
numbers.	
- Many	 different	 variables	 could	 be	 attributed	 to	 extreme	 uncertainty	 and	 complex	
environment,	 as	 some	 of	 the	 variables	 also	 meant	 the	 complexity	 and	 insecurity	 of	 the	
environment	in	Haiti.	
- Staff	composition	changed	constantly	in	the	literature	is	staff	turnover	(emergency	phase).	
- Inexperienced	staff	is	the	same	as	lack	of	skilled	workers	in	the	literature.	
It	 is	 interesting	 to	 see	 that	more	 than	 half	 of	 the	 obstacles	 are	 confirmed	 by	 literature.	 This	
confirms	 the	 literature’s	 relevance	and	actuality.	 The	 remaining	 five	 impediments	 seem	 to	be	
specific	 to	 the	case	of	Medair	 (time	difference,	no	 internet,	mindset	of	 inappropriate	 frugality,	
many	different	locations	and	suppliers,	none	or	different	stock	reports).	
4.6 Diagnostics	and	Recommendations	
These	13	impediments	were	diagnosed	through	the	process	mapping	and	discussions	with	the	
Medair	 ERT.	 The	 discussions	 with	 the	 ERT,	 as	 well	 as	 with	 process	 experts,	 yielded	
recommendations	on	how	to	avoid	these	problems	in	future.	The	following	figure	4.6	presents	
on	one	side	the	problems	observed	and	diagnoses	 in	the	process	mapping	and	the	other	with	
discussed	recommendations.		
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Figure	4.6:	Diagnostics	extracted	from	process	mapping	and	matched	to	improvement	recommendations.	
The	 next	 process	 mapping	 is	 adapted,	 the	 diagnosed	 impediments	 were	 improved	 with	 the	
above-mentioned	recommendations.	
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4.7 Best-case	scenario	Haiti		
The	 recommendations	 from	 ERT	 and	 experts	 will	 now	 be	 put	 into	 practice.	 Ideally,	 the	 Haiti	
response	 should	 have	 been	 conducted	 as	 shown	 in	 the	 adapted	 best-case	 scenario	 process	
mapping	(figure	4.7).	Timewise	it	is	an	improvement	as	the	projects	are	executed	more	efficiently.	
The	time	lag	cannot	be	caught	up	entirely,	but	it	takes	place	earlier:	the	best-case	QIP	starts	now	
on	day	12	(planned	was	day	7),	instead	of	on	day	25	(actual	process	map,	figure	4.3.1).	The	in-
depth	assessment	and	 relief	program	 now	starts	on	 time	on	day	25.	Mainly,	 this	difference	 is	
caused	 by	 a	 restructuring	 of	 responsibilities	 and	 clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 as	 well	 as	 the	
installation	of	pre-positioning.		
Restructuring	 the	 responsibilities	 in	 case	 of	 an	 emergency	 accelerates	 the	 decision	 making	
process.	Instead	of	two	decision	meetings,	only	one	meeting	is	conducted	in	the	adapted	process	
map.	The	present	staff	have	the	respective	information	from	their	areas	of	responsibility	at	hand.	
The	head	of	ER	can	now	decide	on	a	basis	of	facts	and	figures.	Comparing	Medair	with	SKH	on	
this	 issue,	 it	 is	discovered	that	 in	 the	GO,	 the	authority	 lines	are	clearly	defined.	 It	 seems	this	
enables	 faster	decisions.	Also,	 the	 clear	 roles	 in	 the	decision	meeting	help	make	an	 informed	
decision.	Medair	shows	a	similar	trend:	in	their	evaluation,	the	team	decided	to	introduce	shorter	
meetings	where	roles	are	clearly	appointed.		
Clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 come	with	 the	 installation	 of	 clear	 responsibilities.	 If	 the	 team	
leader	 from	 the	 ERT	 knows	 that	 he	has	 the	 last	 decision	on	 the	base	 location,	 he	will	 decide	
quicker	and	communicate	it	to	his	boss	at	HQ	and	his	team	in	the	field.	Or	else,	if	HQ	has	the	last	
decision,	the	team	leader	in	the	field	would	directly	communicate	with	HQ	and	then	implement	
this	decision.	Whatever	way	an	organisation	may	decide	 to	go,	clear	 roles	and	responsibilities	
implicate	clear	lines	of	communication	which	are	assumed	to	lead	to	faster	decision	making	and	
thus	implementation	of	activities.	
Pre-positioning	“aims	to	position	supplies	or	other	resources	at	or	near	places	where	they	are	
likely	to	be	required”	(Oloruntoba	&	Gray,	2006,	p.	117).	Pre-positioning	is	considered	to	make	
emergency	 relief	 more	 efficient	 as	 the	 assistance	 can	 be	 delivered	 at	 maximum	 speed	 and	
minimum	cost	(Roopanarine,	2013).	Also,	this	method	of	procurement	brings	economic	benefit	
to	 the	 communities	 and	 builds	 resilience	 through	 a	 local	 production	 (Roopanarine,	 2013).	 It	
makes	the	organisation	in	the	field	as	well	as	the	reporting	a	 lot	easier	since	there	is	only	one	
supply	source.	Only	the	transport	vehicles	need	to	be	organised	 in	the	field.	However,	putting	
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pre-positioning	 in	 place	 is	 challenging	because	 it	 takes	 a	 lot	 of	 resources:	 it	 needs	 time	 for	 a	
project	 team	 to	 establish	 a	new	 concept	 and	 large	 funds	 to	be	 able	 to	pay	 for	 transport	 and	
prepositioned	relief	items.	The	items	will	be	stored	in	strategically	placed	warehouses	all	year	to	
be	ready	for	the	emergency.	This	requires	funds	for	maintenance,	rent	and	fast	transportation.	
Trainings	and	manuals	need	to	be	adapted	to	prepare	staff	for	this	new	approach.	Shipping	relief	
items	is	usually	quite	slow	as	it	takes	a	few	days	to	weeks,	therefore	the	first	distribution	(assess	
and	assist)	has	to	be	organised	with	items	procured	locally	or	taken	by	plane,	which	is	costly	too.	
Even	 though	 the	mindset	 of	 having	 enough	money	 for	 emergency	 response	 allows	 for	more	
spending,	it	is	challenging	to	find	a	donor	who	pays	for	improvements	indirectly	related	to	the	
relief	operation,	thus	an	‘advance’	for	internal	process	reforms	and	pre-positioning.	This	project	
remains	unattractive	 to	donors	 as	no	direct	 reward	 in	 terms	of	 children	being	 fed	or	 families	
sheltered	is	received,	unless	the	donor	takes	a	longer-term	view.		
The	next	figure	(4.7)	shows	the	adapted	process	mapping,	where	the	impediments	are	taken	out	
and	 the	 recommendations	 are	 implemented.	 Thus,	 figure	 4.7	 represent	 an	 ideal	 best-case	
scenario	of	the	emergency	response	Haiti.		
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Figure	4.7:	Adapted	process	mapping	of	emergency	response	(recommendations	implemented)	(page	1/2).	
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Figure	4.7:	Adapted	process	mapping	of	emergency	response	(recommendations	implemented)	(page	2/2).	
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4.8 How	Should	Improvements	be	Shared?	
The	interviews	and	the	process	mapping	provided	a	broad	variety	of	answers	to	the	question	of	
how	improvement	ideas	shall	be	shared.	Ideas	range	from	factsheets,	index	cards,	a	booklet,	a	
smartphone	application	to	trainings	and	simulations.	For	definite	humanitarian	practitioners	do	
not	have	the	time	and	resources	to	read	nor	the	space	to	take	with	them	a	thick	handbook.	An	
application	seems	practical,	however,	if	the	access	to	information	is	bound	to	internet	access	or	
reception,	 it	 is	 not	worth	much	 in	most	 ER.	 A	 practical	 suggestion	was	 the	 combination	 of	 a	
training	simulation	and	a	booklet	for	the	field.	This	organisation	has	prior	positive	experience	with	
using	simulations	as	the	experience	imprints	itself	in	people’s	memory.	A	small,	clearly	structured	
and	visual	booklet	can	help	complement	this	experience.	Thus,	the	thesis	will	resume	the	finding	
in	a	booklet	(section	5.3).	 	
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5 Discussion	
The	 results	 from	 the	 interviews,	 the	 questionnaire	 and	 the	 process	 mapping	 are	 now	
systematised	 and	 appreciated	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 the	 literature.	 All	 three	 parts	 of	 the	
research	question	are	discussed:	First,	the	impediments	found	in	literature	are	compared	to	the	
research	 findings.	 Second,	 the	 impediments	are	 systematized	with	 the	help	of	 a	prioritisation	
matrix	in	order	to	crystallise	feasible	recommendations.	Three	recommendations	are	chosen	and	
deductively	developed	by	means	of	Rosenstiel’s	(2010)	conditions	of	behaviour.	Then,	through	
inductive	 reasoning,	 all	 13	 recommendations	 are	 matched	 to	 different	 approaches	 to	
improvement.	Third,	the	concept	structure	of	a	format	is	proposed	for	practitioners	to	consult	
when	needed.	
5.1 What	are	the	Impediments	to	Information	Flow	in	General?	
All	impediments	to	information	flow	found	in	the	research	are	now	summarized	and	appreciated	
on	the	background	of	the	literature	findings.	This	section	is	structured	using	the	chapters	of	the	
literature	review	in	order	to	put	the	impediments	into	context	(emergency	relief,	humanitarian	
logistics	and	information	flow).	
5.1.1 Impediments	to	Information	Flow	in	Emergency	Relief		
The	business	of	emergency	relief	is	marked	with	complexity	and	uncertainty	(Van	Wassenhove,	
2006;	Tatham	&	Spens,	2011).	Day	et	al.	(2009)	finds	uncertainty	in	terms	of	demand,	supplies	
and	assessment.	In	the	process	mapping	a	clear	uncertainty	of	supplies	became	apparent.	Three	
different	suppliers	had	to	be	found	as	one	alone	was	not	able	to	provide	all	relief	operations.	In	
the	 questionnaire,	 five	 of	 ten	 respondents	 considered	 complexity	 as	 an	 impediment	 because	
there	 is	 no	 infrastructure,	 too	many	 locations	 and	 suppliers	 and	 bad	 security	 conditions.	 The	
communications	 infrastructure	 further	 complicated	 the	 flow	of	 information	 (Tatham	&	Spens,	
2011),	as	 the	 field	 team	did	not	have	reception	and	only	accessed	 little	data	transfer	 through	
satellite	communications.	Van	Wassenhove	(2006,	p.	477)	considers	the	high	staff	turnover	to	be	
a	 problem	as	 it	 results	 in	 a	 short	 supply	 of	 skilled	workers.	 This	was	 confirmed	 in	 the	 results	
gathered	 through	 all	 three	 research	 methods.	 The	 process	 mapping	 showed	 that	 the	 staff	
turnover	especially	harmed	the	operations	as	many	relief	operations	were	conducted	by	different	
team	leaders,	meaning	that	every	new	leader	first	had	to	gain	an	understanding	of	the	context	
before	he	was	able	 to	bring	 relief.	Day	et	al.	 (2009),	Thakur-Weigold	et	al.	 (in	press)	and	Van	
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Wassenhove	(2006)	pledge	for	more	efficient	relief	operations.	However,	the	efficiency	mindset	
is	not	easily	realisable:	The	Haiti	response	team	had	to	organise	ships	in	order	to	reach	remote	
areas,	which	was	probably	not	 the	 fastest	 transport.	Also,	 the	satellite	communication	should	
have	been	used	more	to	reach	beneficiaries	faster	with	help,	even	though	the	costs	were	high.	
However,	because	the	team	was	restricted	in	their	ability	to	spend	more	money	for	relief,	being	
efficient	in	saving	lives	becomes	even	more	challenging.	Also,	the	diversity	of	factors	hinders	a	
clear	 view	of	 the	problem	and	 the	combination	 renders	 the	crisis	 complex	 (Van	Wassenhove,	
2006,	 p.	 478).	 In	 the	 process	mapping	 clearly	 too	many	 variables	was	 a	 problem	 in	 the	Haiti	
response.	
5.1.2 Impediments	to	Information	Flow	in	Humanitarian	Logistics		
Other	research	(e.g.	Tatham	&	Christopher,	2014)	has	shown	that	logistics	is	not	always	included	
in	 strategic	 planning	 and	budgeting,	which	 is	 confirmed	 to	 be	 a	 problem	 in	 the	 interviews:	 If	
logistics	is	only	a	support	function,	it	will	never	have	the	possibility	to	be	integrated	in	all	steps	
and	 receive	 appropriate	 backing	 from	 donors	 along	 the	 way.	 The	 interview	 with	 Medair	
demonstrated	that	strategic	integration	is	necessary	for	project	planning	because	logistics	knows	
best	the	conditions	for	procurement	and	delivery.	
The	literature	states	a	decentralized	coordination	system	enables	better	decision	making	when	
the	understanding	of	local	conditions	is	crucial	for	the	operation	(Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	in	press;	
Dolinskaya	et	al.,	2011;	Stephenson,	2005;	Tatham	&	Christopher,	2014,	p.	22).	 In	 the	case	of	
Haiti,	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 local	 conditions	was	 crucial;	 political	 disorganisation,	 security	
issues	as	well	as	searching	for	suppliers	all	made	the	operational	context	quite	complex.		
	
Figure	5.1.2:	Decentralized	and	centralized	coordination	system.	
Decision	making	in	INGO1,	INGO2	and	the	GO	can	be	situated	on	a	continuum	where	the	field	
teams	and	HQ	have	different	power	(figure	5.1.2).	Within	INGO1	(Medair),	decisions	are	taken	in	
coordination	between	HQ	and	the	field	team	leader.	According	to	Sahin	and	Robinson.	(2002,	p.	
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centre makes all 
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518f),	this	model	of	decision	making	can	be	qualified	as	a	mixture	between	centralized	(centre	
makes	 all	 decisions)	 and	 decentralized	 (each	 market	 makes	 its	 own	 decision)	 coordination	
structure.	 INGO2	 (MAF)	 delegates	 as	many	 decisions	 as	 possible	 down	 the	 hierarchy,	 a	 local	
approach.	The	GO	(SHA)	provides	information	on	the	local	context	to	HQ,	but	the	head	of	ER	at	
HQ	is	the	main	decision	maker.	The	question	is,	would	local	decision	making	have	accelerated	the	
Medair	 operation?	The	HQ	back	up	 for	 the	decision	on	 the	base	 and	operation	 locations	has	
generated	(also	due	to	the	time	difference)	a	time	lag.	Therefore,	a	delegation	of	decision	to	the	
field	authority	might	have	accelerated	the	relief	distribution	by	two	days.	However,	HQ	is	closer	
to	donors	and	knows	the	financial	information	about	the	size	of	the	project	better.	It	depends	on	
the	organisation	whether	centralized	or	decentralized	coordination	is	to	choose.	
Another	important	impediment	is	the	changing	of	operational	priorities	(Day	et	al.,	2012,	p.	25),	
observed	in	the	process	mapping.	The	field	team	of	INGO1	adapted	the	numbers	constantly	as	
the	needs	continued	to	increase.	Therefore,	this	impediment	was	confirmed	through	experience.	
Also,	 funding	 is	 directed	 towards	 relief	 activities	 and	 rarely	 supports	 internal	 development	
(Thomas	 &	 Mizushima,	 2005,	 p.	 60).	 The	 interviewees	 confirmed	 this	 clearly:	 there	 is	 little	
resource	for	process	development	and	personal	development.	However,	IHOs	should	draw	the	
institutional	donor’s	attention	to	the	cost	of	not	including	expenses	like	internal	development.	
NGOs	 should	 advocate	 for	 resources	 for	 internal	 development	 from	 institutional	 donors	 and	
disclose	 the	 impact	 of	 process	 development	on	 the	 efficiency	of	 aid,	 thereby	 improving	 their	
impact	in	emergency	response.		
Technology	is	developing	fast	and	information	management	systems	are	crucial	because	these	
can	 help	 automatize	 and	 share	 information	 faster	 than	 before.	 Information	 sharing	 systems	
“alleviate	the	 impact	of	 information	 impediments	of	 future	disasters	and	 lead	to	an	 improved	
flow	 of	 resources”	 (Day	 et	 al.,	 2009,	 p.	 653).	 The	 answers	 from	 the	 interviews	 and	 from	 the	
questionnaire	showed	a	mixed	picture:	many	organisations	use	some	kind	of	tools	or	systems,	
however,	 inadequate	streams,	storage	misalignment,	need	for	robust	equipment,	 inconsistent	
format	 and	 internet	 connection	 are	 still	 challenges	 in	 the	 daily	 humanitarian	 sector.	 Larger	
organisations	own	an	overall	IM	system	for	internal	as	well	as	external	coordination.	However,	
interviewees	 from	middle-sized	 IHOs	 voiced	 aspirations	 for	 an	 organisation-wide	 information	
sharing	system.	Smaller	organisations	do	not	have	the	funds	to	install	information	management	
(IM)	 systems	 featuring	 dashboards	 for	 the	 management	 as	 well	 as	 co-working	 functions	 for	
coordination	between	HQ	and	FO	in	projects.		
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5.1.3 Impediments	to	Information	Sharing	
Reindorp	and	Wiles	(2001),	Akhtar	et	al.	(2012)	and	Sahin	and	Robinson	(2002)	claim	that	good	
information	sharing	is	a	prerequisite	for	good	coordination.	The	process	mapping	shows	that	the	
timely	 exchange	 of	 information	 was	 crucial	 for	 project	 development.	 The	 time	 difference	
between	 Haiti	 and	 Switzerland	 was	 experienced	 as	 being	 a	 challenge	 and	 disabled	 the	
communication	of	crucial	change	in	time.	The	bullwhip	effect,	observed	by	Forrester	(1958)	also	
contributes	 to	 that:	 the	 natural	 tendency	 to	 amplify	 numbers	 was	 observed	 in	 the	 process	
mapping;	the	project	team	adapted	the	numbers	constantly	due	to	new	information.	This	caused	
confusion	at	HQ	in	finance	and	fundraising	as	the	changes	were	not	traceable	and	they	still	had	
to	communicate	the	budget	increase	to	donors.	The	project	team	on	the	field	did	not	understand	
the	consequences	their	actions	triggered	in	the	finance	and	fundraising	team	at	HQ.	Additionally,	
waiting	for	the	funding	approval	and	no	internet	connection	contributed	to	the	bullwhip	effect	
leading	to	the	large	time	lag.	
The	 quality	 of	 the	 organisational	 structure	 within	 large	 organisations	 rarely	 seemed	 to	 be	 a	
problem.	In	the	questionnaire,	the	logistics	officer	from	the	ICRC	selected	all	of	the	organisational	
structure-related	 impediments	 as	 appearing	 “rarely”.	 Also,	 the	 emergency	 response	manager	
from	 the	 GO	marked	 none	 of	 these	 as	 impeding	 “often”.	 Both	 statements	 speak	 for	 a	 good	
structure	at	large	organisations.	However,	the	subject	of	internal	structure	may	be	delicate	when	
communicating	 it	 to	 external	 researchers.	 Therefore,	 stating	 ‘the	 larger	 the	 organisation,	 the	
better	the	organisational	structure’	could	be	biased	and	needs	further	analysis.		
Impediments	related	to	staff	need	some	explanation	at	this	point.	It	is	important	to	notice	that	
three	out	of	four	impediments	classified	as	happening	‘often’	by	half	or	more	of	the	respondents	
are	 concerned	 with	 staff	 turnover	 (generally	 and	 in	 the	 emergency	 phase)	 or	 lack	 of	 skills.	
Turnover	is	extremely	high	in	this	field	(eight	out	of	ten	state	this	was	“often”	an	impediment).	
Literature	confirms	this	(Thakur-Weigold	et	al.,	 in	press;	Van	Wassenhove,	2006).	Akhtar	et	al.	
(2012,	 p.	 98)	 observes	 a	 lack	 skilled	 workers	 such	 as	 trained	 operational	 staff	 and	 logistics	
managers,	 amongst	others.	 The	 results	 from	 the	 research	 show	 that	 for	 rapid-onset	disasters	
such	as	Haiti,	skilled	staff	were	not	available	 in	every	organisation,	even	though	 it	 is	crucial	to	
have	them.	One	idea	for	improvement	is	taking	no	more	newcomers	for	rapid-onset	disasters.	
However,	skilled	staff	also	need	to	receive	the	possibility	to	develop	their	skills	in	order	to	become	
experienced.	Therefore,	the	recommendation	is	to	assure	a	good	mix	of	experienced	and	new	
relief	workers.	Due	to	the	inexperience	and	the	rapid	handovers,	many	team	leaders	in	INGO1	
used	 different	 distribution	 forms	 (therefore	 different	 data	was	 collected),	 which	 complicated	
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reporting.	 In	 the	 past	 years,	 many	 useful	 checklists	 have	 been	 established	 to	 contribute	 to	
successful	 operations	 (e.g.	 The	 Sphere	 Project	 (2011)	 standards	 and	 checklists,	 internal	
procurement	and	distribution	checklists	etc.).	However,	the	 introduction	of	checklists	requires	
intensive	training.	Every	IHO	works	with	checklists,	even	if	the	degree	of	standardisation	of	theses	
varies.	In	order	to	improve	skills,	the	recommendation	from	one	of	the	interviewees	of	Medair	
was	 to	 improve	 training	 and	 set	 exams	 for	 reassurance	 of	 good	 quality.	 This	 is	 done	 by	 SHA	
already,	 operating	 on	 a	 much	 larger	 budget	 than	 Medair.	 Other	 ideas	 consider	 targeted	
recruitment	or	a	need	to	investment	and	“grow	your	own	staff”.		
The	 next	 section	 takes	 the	 recommendations	 for	 improvement	 of	 the	 above	 mentioned	
impediments	and	discusses	the	improvements.	
5.2 How	can	Information	Flow	be	Improved?	
The	 recommendations	 for	 Medair,	 identified	 during	 the	 process	 mapping	 and	 the	 reflection	
afterwards,	have	the	potential	to	avoid	or	reduce	the	impact	of	some	impediments	and	thereby	
improve	 information	 flow.	 Section	 4.6	 mentions	 all	 13	 recommendations.	 This	 chapter	
systematises	 the	 recommendations	and	prioritises	 in	order	 to	elaborate	 three	 in	more	detail.	
These	three	recommendations	are	tailored	to	be	applied	in	Medair.	
5.2.1 Prioritise	Recommendations		
By	 means	 of	 a	 prioritisation	 matrix,	 the	 recommendations	 from	 the	 process	 mapping	 are	
prioritised	and	selected	for	individual	elaboration.	In	order	to	prepare	all	13	recommendations	
for	prioritisation,	the	following	scoring	shows	how	the	input	and	output	weight	was	calculated	by	
the	researcher	(table	5.2.1a).	The	two	axes	define	the	categorisation:	
INPUT:	How	much	effort	has	to	be	inserted	to	put	this	recommendation	in	practice?	Three	criteria	
are	used	to	qualify	the	 input:	How	many	resources	are	needed,	to	which	degree	 is	a	strategic	
decision	needed	and	how	urgent	is	the	implementation	of	this	recommendation?	
OUTPUT:	To	what	degree	does	this	recommendation	improve	information	flow	if	put	in	practice	
in	an	organisation?	
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Table	5.2.1a:	Calculation	of	input	and	output	for	each	recommendation.		
The	criteria	were	created	by	the	researcher.	By	means	of	this	scoring,	the	recommendations	are	
allocated	into	the	subsequent	prioritisation	matrix.	
	
Figure	5.2.1:	The	prioritisation	matrix	classifies	recommendations	according	to	input	and	output.	
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This	prioritisation	matrix,	a	management	tool	for	systematising	decisions,	is	used	and	adapted	by	
the	 researcher	 for	 situating	 the	 recommendations.	The	goal	of	prioritisation	 is	 to	know	which	
recommendation	is	most	suitable	to	be	implemented	(where	is	the	biggest	output	and	a	relatively	
small	input).	
On	observation,	the	majority	of	the	recommendations	are	either	heavy	chunks,	needing	a	lot	of	
input	to	realise	this	recommendation	but	the	output	is	equally	big,	or	complete	successes	with	
small	input	and	a	big	output.	From	all	recommendations,	three	topics	are	chosen	for	elaboration,	
on	 the	basis	of	 feasibility	 regarding	 the	 limits	of	 this	 thesis.	The	 three	 following	 improvement	
suggestions	are	situated	in	the	complete	success	square:	standardise	forms	(12),	define	clear	lines	
of	 communication	 (1)	 and	modification	with	 explanatory	 statement	 (4).	 In	 order	 to	 know	 the	
approach	of	intervention	for	each	recommendation,	the	condition	for	its	realisation	needs	to	be	
understood;	 Who	 has	 the	 decisive	 lever	 and	 what	 kind	 of	 activities	 are	 requested	 for	 its	
implementation?	Rosenstiel	(2010)	asks	four	questions	(whenever	a	staff’s	behaviour	does	not	
meet	the	expectations),	which	are	adapted	to	the	recommendations	and	complemented	with	the	
condition	 of	 the	 behaviour	 and	 the	 approach	 of	 intervention	 (based	 on	 A.	 Angerer,	 personal	
communication,	March	15,	2017)	(table	5.2.1b).	
ROSENSTIEL		
(2010,	p.	347)	
ADAPTED	TO	
RECOMMENDATIONS	
CONDITION	OF	
BEHAVIOUR	
APPROACH	OF	
INTERVENTION	
Was	he	not	able	to	do	
it?	
Is	the	staff	able	to	
implement	this	alone?	
Individual	skills	(ability)	 ➡	Training	
Did	he	not	want	to	do	
it?	
Does	the	
implementation	
depend	on	the	will	of	
the	staff?	
Individual	desire	
(volition)	
➡	Difficult	to	
influence.	Maybe	partly	
HR-incentives	
Was	he	not	allowed	to	
do	it?	
Does	the	
implementation	
require	a	strategic	
decision	from	higher	
level?	
Empowerment	and	
obligation	
➡	Management	
induces	change	
Did	he	not	have	the	
necessary	resources	or	
were	there	impeding	
barriers?	
Does	the	
implementation	
depend	on	the	
situation?	
Situational	enabling	 ➡	Difficult	to	influence	
Table	5.2.1b:	Questions	to	ask	for	categorization	(development	based	on	Rosenstiel,	2010).	
The	questions	from	table	5.2.1b	were	asked	for	each	aforementioned	recommendation	in	order	
to	be	able	to	categorize	them	in	the	following	table.	The	arrows	show	the	possible	approach	for	
intervention	in	this	condition.	Some	recommendations	are	allocated	to	two	or	three	conditions	
because	both	or	all	three	approaches	of	intervention	are	needed	for	the	implementation	of	this	
recommendation.		
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Empowerment	and	obligation	(➡Management)	
1.	Define	clear	lines	of	communication	
2.	Define	power	of	decisions	in	emergencies	
3.	Clear	roles	and	responsibilities	
6.	Knowing	&	communicating	that	emergencies	
always	well	financed	
9.	Pre-positioning		
11.	Prolong	handover	time		
13.	Training	and	Exams	
Individual	desire	(➡Difficult	to	handle)	
1.	Define	clear	lines	of	communication	
4.	Modification	with	explanatory	statement	
11.	Prolong	handover	time	
Situational	enabling	(➡Difficult	to	change)	
8.	Reduce	variables		
11.	Prolong	handover	time		
Individual	skills	(➡Training)	
4.	Modification	with	explanatory	statement	
5.	Set	and	stick	to	one	block	of	project	
7.	Smaller	response	
10.	Send	one	big	proposal	to	donors	
12.	Standardise	forms		
13.	Training	and	Exams	
Notes:	Colours	according	to	the	prioritisation	matrix:	Red-Hands	off!;	Green-Complete	Success.	
Underlined	green-Chosen	recommendations	for	elaboration.	
Table	5.2.1c:	Recommendations	arranged	in	the	four	conditions	of	behaviour	(Rosenstiel,	2010,	p.	348).	
Most	 recommendations	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 conditions	 empowerment	 and	 obligation	 and	
individual	 skills.	 In	 order	 to	 boost	 individual	 skills,	 staff	 need	 training.	 In	 order	 to	 implement	
recommendations	 in	 terms	 of	 empowerment	 and	 obligation,	 the	 management	 decides	 on	
strategies,	regulations	and	concepts	and	thereby	defines	new	ways	of	(inter)action.	Training	or	
change	induced	by	management	are	two	feasible	options,	compared	to	the	options	for	situational	
enabling	or	individual	desire	where	the	room	for	manoeuvre	is	rather	small	and	difficult	to	handle.		
Three	recommendations	are	now	drawn	out	and	elaborated	in	detail	for	Medair’.	This	includes	
how	the	recommendation	solves	the	problem	matched,	how	it	can	be	 implemented	(with	the	
help	of	Rosenstiel’s	model)	and	in	which	way	it	improves	information	flow.	When	implementing	
change,	it	is	essential	to	take	into	account	the	eight	critical	success	factors	of	Kotter	(1995)	for	a	
fundamental	change.	
5.2.2 Standardise	Forms	
How	does	 standardising	 forms	 solve	 the	 problem	of	 different	 stock	 reports?	One	 problem	of	
INGO1’s	operation	in	Haiti	was	the	constantly	different	stock	reports	which	every	new	response	
team	leader	used.	Team	leaders	did	not	know	which	hygiene	kits	they	were	distributing	as	they	
had	 three	 suppliers	 in	 fifteen	 remote	 locations.	 The	 stock	 reports	 often	 did	 not	 contain	 any	
signature	or	even	only	a	fingerprint	from	the	beneficiary	such	that	tracking	down	became	very	
complicated.	This	 turned	 reporting	 into	disorder;	HQ	 logistics	officers	could	not	 specify	which	
supplier	delivered	which	hygiene	kit	to	which	beneficiary	group.	However,	 institutional	donors	
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require	 exact	 data	 about	 distribution	of	 relief	 items	 (where,	what,	 to	whom,	why).	 The	 team	
recommended	 the	 use	 of	 standardised	 forms.	 A	
standardisation	 would	 resolve	 in	 uniform	 reports	 and	
facilitate	 team	 work	 as	 these	 contain	 all	 necessary	
information.	 Standardisation	 in	 this	 case	 would	 facilitate	
reporting	from	field	to	HQ	as	well	as	reporting	to	donors.	
The	 development	 of	 standard	 forms	 would	 mean	
incorporating	 all	 required	 information	 from	 the	departments	 involved	–	 logistics,	 finance	 and	
human	resources.	The	standardised	form	with	user	guide	could	have	the	positive	side	effect	of	
creating	 that	 understanding	 between	 departments,	 a	 central	 element	 mentioned	 in	 several	
interviews	and	in	the	mapping.	
How	can	standardising	forms	be	implemented?	Developing	a	distribution	report	or	a	stock	report	
for	warehouses	for	the	emergency	response	team	could	be	a	start.	This	will	not	need	a	strategic	
decision	 from	 top	management,	 however,	 a	 sector	 advisor	 and	 the	 head	 or	manager	 of	 the	
concerned	department	will	need	to	agree	and	support	the	initiative.	First,	a	template	should	be	
developed	which	includes	the	information	from	all	departments	needed.	A	distribution	reporting	
sheet	contains	all	necessary	information	and	operates	as	piece	of	acknowledgment	for	different	
departments	 (examples	 can	 be	 found	 at	 UNHCR,	 1997,	 p.	 63).	 Second,	 the	 introduction	 to	
relevant	 staff	 across	 the	 whole	 organisation	 should	 be	 planned;	 a	 guideline	 explaining	 the	
different	 lines	 of	 content	 for	 a	 common	 understanding	would	 be	 beneficial.	 Additionally,	 the	
forms	would	be	introduced	to	the	basic	staff	training	of	the	organisation.	In	order	to	transfer	the	
knowledge,	the	trainer	can	adhere	to	Rosenstiel’s	principles	conducive	to	transfer	 (Rosenstiel,	
Molt	&	Rütiger,	2005,	S.	412)	such	as	simulating	a	distribution	where	the	form	is	used.	
In	which	way	does	standardised	forms	improve	information	flow?	
- Standardised	forms	contain	all	necessary	information,	no	double	inquiry	needed	
- Facilitates	reporting	to	HQ	and	to	donors	
- Better	 team	 work	 and	 a	 common	 understanding	 between	 departments	 facilitates	
information	flow		
5.2.3 Define	Clear	Lines	of	Communication	
How	do	clear	lines	of	communication	solve	the	problems	of	security	issues	and	time	difference?	
The	definition	of	clear	 lines	of	communication	could	be	attributed	to	Rosenstiel’s	condition	of	
Figure	5.2.2:	Diagnostic	associated	
to	the	recommendation	to	
standardise	forms.	
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empowerment	and	obligation.	The	management	has	the	decision	power	to	define	and	enforce	
lines	of	reporting	and	communication.	When	the	lines	are	clear,	it	is	also	the	task	of	the	staff	to	
communicate	according	to	these	lines.	In	Medair,	the	communication	lines	seemed	not	always	to	
be	clear.	Problems	came	up	when	security	worries	from	HQ	and	the	time	difference	complicated	
communication.	 First,	 the	 security	 worries	 from	 HQ	 proved	 unfounded	 as	 they	 had	 no	 local	
knowledge.	If	the	communication	line	was	clear	and	only	from	one	person	to	the	team	leader	(TL)	
in	the	field,	these	concerns	could	have	been	cleared	up	in	the	first	communication.	Second,	the	
time	difference	impeded	timely	information	flow	from	HQ	to	the	field	and	vice	versa.	If	clear	lines	
of	 communication	 had	 been	 installed,	 a	 clear	 idea	 of	 when	 the	 new	 decisions	 needed	 to	 be	
communicated	to	the	field	TL	in	order	to	reach	him	on	time	before	the	start	of	the	working	day,	
could	have	prevented	many	delays.	Also,	the	need	of	HQ	staff	adapting	temporarily	their	working	
hours	to	minimise	time	difference	shall	be	considered.	Clear	roles	and	responsibilities	need	to	
support	 clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 as	 they	 presuppose	 each	 other.	 In	 the	 occasion	 of	
misunderstandings,	HQ	anticipated	the	field	team	leader’s	decision,	while	he	only	required	an	
appreciation	of	 the	situation	 from	HQ.	The	team	 leader	needed	an	HQ	estimation	to	take	the	
decision	in	the	field.	Due	to	the	back	and	forth	in	the	communication,	the	decision	making	on	the	
base	spot	and	distribution	 locations	 took	 too	 long	 (three	days).	 Interviews	confirmed	that	 the	
final	decision	maker	should	be	clearly	defined.	Is	the	final	decision	maker	in	the	field	or	at	HQ	and	
for	which	decisions	is	this	the	case?	Clear	roles	and	responsibilities	in	turn	induce	clear	lines	of	
communication	because	 the	competencies	are	 clarified.	The	 interview	with	 the	governmental	
organisation	showed	that	their	communication	concept	specified	clear	communication	lines	and	
a	clear	hierarchy.	This	appeared	to	be	an	evident	advantage	for	their	efficient	operation.		
How	 can	 clear	 lines	 of	 communication	 be	 implemented?	 This	 recommendation	 can	 only	 be	
implemented	with	a	convinced	and	strong	management.	The	assignment	for	a	concept	of	clear	
lines	 of	 communication	 will	 be	 decided	 by	 the	 leadership	 to	 have	 a	 direct	 effect	 on	 the	
Figure	5.2.3:	Diagnostics	associated	to	the	recommendation	clear	lines	of	communication.	
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organisational	 structure	 and	 responsible	 heads	 of	 departments.	 The	 assignment	 may	 be	
combined	with	the	clarification	of	roles	and	responsibilities.	However,	a	redefinition	of	roles	and	
responsibilities	could	enlarge	the	project	to	a	large-scale	restructuring.	Every	head	of	department	
will	 have	 to	 be	 involved	 if	 the	 restructuring	 is	 done	 organisation-wide.	 An	 appointed	 project	
leader	 and	 his	 team	 for	 the	 project	 of	 redefinition	 of	 roles	 and	 responsibilities	 and	 lines	 of	
communication	be	from	the	department	where	the	project	is	 implemented	(for	example	ERT).	
Once	the	new	concept	of	the	restructuring	is	established,	the	project	team	needs	to	decide	in	
which	ways	the	new	lines	of	communication	will	be	communicated	to	other	departments	as	well	
as	temporary	staff	and	staff	working	in	the	field.	Incorporation	in	the	emergency	team	training	
and	guidelines	is	a	must.	Otherwise,	information	sessions	throughout	the	next	few	months	can	
be	planned	and	internal	information	channels	shall	be	used.	
In	which	way	do	clear	lines	of	communication	improve	information	flow?		
- The	responsible	person	knows	the	direct	way	the	information	goes.		
- It	optimizes	procedures	and	minimises	confusions.	
- It	accelerates	information	ways	and	the	team	increases	its	agility	to	react.		
5.2.4 Modification	with	Explanatory	Statement	
How	does	modification	with	explanatory	 statement	 solve	 the	problem	of	 constantly	 changing	
numbers?	 The	 process	 mapping	 with	 Medair	 yielded	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 field	 staff	 constantly	
adapted	numbers	of	project	needs	 in	Haiti.	This	caused	confusion	in	the	HQ	emergency	team,	
dropping	down	to	logistics	as	well	(and	possibly	further	down	to	other	departments).	Decisions	
had	 to	 be	 redone	 at	 HQ,	which	 caused	 disorder	 and	 inefficient	 operations.	 This	 redoing	 and	
inefficiency	consumes	resources	that	could	be	used	for	direct	project	cost.	 If	at	the	root,	 field	
staff	had	to	submit	an	explanatory	statement	whenever	they	change	a	number,	this	would	be	an	
additional	hurdle	to	take.	The	explanatory	statement	could	include	a	structured	reasoning	to	the	
people	down	the	line	who	would	have	to	deal	with	this	information	furthermore.	Thus,	field	staff	
Figure	5.2.4a:	Diagnostic	associated	to	the	recommendation	modification	with	explanatory	statement.	
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would	change	the	numbers	less,	and	if	they	changed	it,	an	explanation	will	go	with	it,	providing	
the	people	down	the	line	with	additional	information	providing	context	about	the	change.		
How	 can	 modification	 with	 explanatory	 statement	 be	 implemented?	 A	 structured	 reasoning	
could	 figure	as	an	additional	hurdle.	One	explanatory	communication	method	 is	 ISBAR.	 In	 the	
medical	sector,	estimations	attribute	the	major	factor	in	60-70%	of	serious	incidents	to	failures	
in	 communication	 (Finnigan,	 Marshall	 and	 Flanagan,	 2010,	 p.	 2).	 ISBAR	 was	 developed	 as	 a	
feasible	and	effective	approach	and	is	“likely	to	result	in	improved	communication	in	the	clinical	
environment”	(Finnigan	et	al.,	2010,	p.2).	ISBAR	(view	figure	5.2.4b)	could	be	adapted	and	applied	
to	the	humanitarian	sector.	The	communication	scheme	helps	to	communicate	changes	in	a	clear,	
structured	and	explanatory	way.	If	we	talk	about	information	that	needs	to	go	from	the	field	back	
to	HQ,	this	scheme	helps	clearly	formulate	changes	and	their	corresponding	background.	Imagine	
a	 situation	 where	 a	 field	 assessment	 officer	 wants	 to	 change	 stock	 orders	 because	 the	 last	
assessment	yielded	detailed	results	about	a	region	with	more	needs	which	was	not	anticipated	
before.	 This	 person	 will	 then	 need	 to	 communicate	 his	 identity,	 situation,	 background,	
assessment	and	request	 in	written	or	oral	form	to	his	counterpart	at	HQ	in	order	to	give	solid	
reasoning	for	changing	numbers.		
	
	
	
	
	
The	HQ	then	is	aware	of	the	change	and	its	context,	and	therefore	able	to	act	upon	this	change.	
In	order	to	implement	such	a	communication	system,	the	concerned	department,	in	our	case	the	
ERT,	would	 start	 as	 a	 first	 pilot	 unit.	 The	model	 could	 be	 inserted	 in	 the	 field	 handbook	 and	
included	in	training.	Rosenstiel’s	principle	conducive	to	transfer	(Rosenstiel	et	al.,	2005,	S.	412)	
of	repeating	of	the	learned	content	(here	the	ISBAR	model)	will	further	the	learning	process.		In	
Rosenstiel’s	dimensions,	it	needs	individual	skills	and	desire	to	implement	and	utilise	such	a	new	
system.	 It	 could	 be	 described	 like	 a	 checklist.	 If	 ISBAR	 is	 successful,	 the	 organisational	
management	can	think	of	other	departments	where	this	could	be	of	use.		
ISBAR	
For	Clear	Communication	
I	 IDENTIFY:		
Yourself	(name,	position,	location)	&	beneficiary	group	
S	 SITUATION:		
Why	are	you	calling	(if	urgent	-say	so),	what	is	the	
B	 BACKGROUND:		
Tell	the	story	
A	 ASSESSMENT:		
What	you	think	is	going	on	
R	 REQUEST:		
What	you	want	from	them	
Figure	5.2.4b:	ISBAR	model	
(Marshall,	Harrison	and	Flanagan,	
2012,	p.	2)	adapted	to	the	
humanitarian	context	(“patient”	
replaced	by	“beneficiary	group”).		
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In	which	way	can	the	modification	with	explanatory	statement	improve	information	flow?	When	
field	and	HQ	communicate	the	modification	of	stock	and	assessment	numbers	 in	a	structured	
way,	instead	of	simply	change	and	not	document	the	reason	for	the	modification,	the	explanatory	
information	is	transferred	instead	of	getting	lost.	The	ERT	at	HQ	can	react	upon	and	comprehend	
the	change,	instead	of	being	faced	with	a	fait	accompli.	One	side	effect	is	a	potential	decline	in	
the	number	of	changes	due	to	the	related	effort	that	has	to	be	made.	Information	therefore	flows	
directly	from	the	field	to	HQ	and	can	be	processed	in	the	different	departments	(e.g.	modification	
of	proposals	and	communication	to	donors).		
This	 deductive	 reasoning	 started	 with	 Rosenstiel’s	 proposed	 condition	 of	 behaviour	 for	 each	
recommendation	and	described	how	the	recommendation	can	be	implemented	in	Medair	and	
how	it	improves	information	flow.		
5.2.5 Generalising	approaches	to	improvement		
After	 these	three	recommendations	were	elaborated	for	 the	specific	case	of	 this	middle-sized	
IHO,	a	generalisation	shall	be	ventured.	Table	5.2.5	broadens	the	view	and	looks	inductively	at	all	
other	 recommendations	 not	 yet	 discussed	 in	 depth	 and	 questions	 if	 the	 approaches	 of	
interventions	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 other	 recommendations.	 This	 derivation	 of	 general	 principles	
from	the	three	specific	observations	remains	a	probable	suggestion.	Table	5.2.5	seeks	to	provide	
RECOMMENDATION		 APPROACH	OF	INTERVENTION	
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1.	Define	clear	lines	of	communication	 	 	 	 	 	
2.	Define	power	of	decisions	in	emergencies	 	 	 	 	 	
3.	Clear	roles	and	responsibilities	 	 	 	 	 	
4.	Modification	with	explanatory	statement	 	 	 	 	 	
5.	Set	and	stick	to	one	block	of	project	 	 	 	 	 	
6.	Knowing	&	communicating	that	sudden-onset	emergencies	
always	well	financed		
	 	 	 	 	
7.	Smaller	response	 	 	 	 	 	
8.	Reduce	variables	 	 	 	 	 	
9.	Pre-positioning		 	 	 	 	 	
10.	Send	one	big	proposal	to	donors	 	 	 	 	 	
11.	Prolong	handover	time	 	 	 	 	 	
12.	Standardise	forms		 	 	 	 	 	
13.	Training	and	exams	 	 	 	 	 	
Notes:	black-used	approach	in	three	elaborated	examples;	grey-this	approach	could	be	tested.	
Table	5.2.5:	Recommendations	and	further	approaches	to	improvement.	
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ideas	 for	 implementations	of	 recommendations	which	were	not	elaborated.	A	combination	of	
approaches	of	intervention	could	be	beneficial.	The	testing	of	these	approaches	will	be	the	task	
of	future	research.		
5.3 Booklet		
In	 order	 to	 make	 information	 flow	 tangible	 and	 the	 recommendations	 applicable,	 a	 format	
containing	the	aforementioned	recommendations	is	proposed.	It	summarises	literature	learnings	
and	findings	from	the	research.	The	purpose	is	to	make	applicable	models	and	principles	available	
in	a	concise	way,	such	that	practitioners	are	able	to	quickly	consult	it	and	adapt	the	principles	for	
their	work	environment	to	improve	information	flow	locally.	The	content	shall	be	adapted	to	the	
particular	organisation,	so	 that	best	practise	cases	and	 internal	structures	 (not	being	 found	 in	
handbooks,	checklists	or	guidelines)	can	be	integrated.	Interviews	yielded	very	different	results	
when	 asking	 about	 the	 type	 of	 format.	 Some	 prefer	 a	 booklet,	 others	 training,	 others	 a	
smartphone	 application.	 However,	 if	 there	 is	 no	 reception	 or	 battery,	 the	 content	 should	 be	
manually	available.	A	booklet	seems	to	be	the	most	practical	as	it	can	be	taken	on	person	and	the	
content	can	be	read	in	a	short	amount	of	time.		
Introduction	to	the	booklet	shall	be	done	in	trainings	to	lead	to	the	desired	outcome,	the	practical	
use	of	the	booklet	in	the	field.	Training	in	IHOs	has	effectively	led	to	learning	(Thakur-Weigold,	in	
press).	The	topic	of	information	flow	should	be	established	in	one	of	the	introduction	sessions	to	
the	organisation.	The	participants	need	to	experience	the	significant	impact	of	their	information	
sharing	on	their	directly	 related	support	 functions,	on	material	 flows	as	well	as	on	the	overall	
efficiency	of	the	organisation.	For	example,	the	training	session	could	be	composed	of	a	field-like	
situation	where	the	participants	encounter	several	impediments	and	they	are	asked	to	solve	the	
problems.	After	the	simulation,	discussions	on	the	impact,	the	communication	lines	as	well	as	the	
teamwork	could	be	added	for	a	deeper	understanding.	
The	booklet	is	simply	structured	and	clearly	visualized	to	enable	a	quick	overview.	The	following	
three	pages	are	a	proposition	of	the	most	important	subjects	concerning	information	flow.	Yet,	
the	bullet	points	remain	only	an	indication	of	an	important	subject	and	have	to	be	established	by	
the	INGO	for	their	specific	end	use.	
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6 Conclusion	and	Implications	
This	thesis	attempted	to	introduce	readers	to	the	opportunities	and	importance	of	information	
flow	 in	 disaster	 response.	 It	 sought	 to	 identify	what	makes	 information	 flow	 different.	 It	 has	
explored	why	research	into	information	flow	is	timely,	necessary	and	needed.	When	information	
flow	in	disaster	response	is	studied,	not	only	understanding,	but	also	development,	of	a	broader	
and	richer	understanding	of	supply	chains	is	reached.	Studying	humanitarian	disaster	relief	supply	
chains	and	information	flows	provides	opportunities	to	improve	processes.		
This	 section	 resumes	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 research	 question,	 points	 out	 limitations,	 clarifies	
implications	for	practitioners	and	theory,	names	general	learnings	and	gives	an	outlook	on	further	
research	topics.		
6.1 Answer	to	the	Research	Question		
Through	interviews,	questionnaire	and	process	mapping,	this	thesis	aimed	to	answer	the	question	
of	what	kind	of	 impediments	 to	 information	 flow	exist,	how	 it	 can	be	 improved	and	how	this	
knowledge	shall	be	shared.		
First,	impediments	to	information	flow	are	numerous	and	can	be	categorized	in	three	different	
areas:	In	emergency	relief,	complexity,	uncertainty	and	the	diversity	of	factors	are	found	to	be	
situational	impedient	circumstances.	Regarding	humanitarian	logistics,	the	non-strategic	position	
of	logistics,	centralized	coordination	systems,	changing	of	operational	priorities,	limited	funding	
for	 internal	 development	 and	 the	 inaccessibility	 to	 all-encompassing	 IM	 systems	 for	 smaller	
organisations	impede	information	flow.	Regarding	information	sharing,	the	time	difference,	the	
high	staff	turnover	and	limited	technical	skills	are	considered	to	be	obstacles.		
Secondly,	 the	recommendations	to	 improve	 information	flow	from	the	process	mapping	point	
out	 the	 potential	 of	 technical	 and	behavioural	 skills	 trainings	 as	well	 as	 the	 power	 of	 change	
induced	 from	the	management.	To	 start,	 the	assumption	 is	 that	 skills	 trainings	 result	 in	more	
experienced	 staff	 and	 therefore	 improve	 information	 flow.	 The	 trainings	 include	 teaching	
technical	as	well	as	behavioural	communication	skills	to	transfer	the	right	information	at	the	right	
time	to	the	right	people.	Next,	change	induced	by	the	management	has	the	power	to	regulate	
areas	such	as	decision	power,	clear	roles	and	responsibility	and	strategic	decisions	influencing	the	
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general	framework	of	fundamental	conditions	in	the	relief	operation	(e.g.	pre-positioning;	goods	
no	longer	have	to	be	procured	in	the	field,	but	are	shipped	from	the	prepositioned	location).		
Finall,	these	improvement	recommendations	shall	be	shared	through	a	booklet,	due	to	limitations	
in	phone	reception	and	electricity.	The	booklet	shall	be	adapted	to	the	relevant	organisation	and	
introduced	 in	 trainings.	 The	 integration	 into	 a	 cloud	 collaboration	 service,	 intranet	 or	 a	
smartphone	application	are	other	options,	however,	the	content	must	be	available	also	offline.		
The	hypothesis	can	be	confirmed:	The	improved	process	mapping	showed	a	more	efficient	quick	
impact	project	 through	 the	 restructuring	of	 responsibilities	and	communication	as	well	as	 the	
installation	 of	 pre-positioning.	 It	 can	 therefore	 be	 said	 that	 process	 improvement	 fosters	
information	flow	and	contributes	to	more	efficiency	in	humanitarian	operations.		
6.2 Limitations	of	Research	
This	research	aspired	to	combine	humanitarian	logistics	and	process	management	tools	in	order	
to	find	out	how	the	process	of	information	flow	can	be	improved.	General	research	included	five	
INGOs	and	one	GO.	The	deeper	case	study	with	Medair	investigated	the	flow	of	information	in	
the	first	ten	weeks	of	the	Matthew	response,	in	emergency	and	logistic	teams	between	HQ	and	
the	field	office.	Other	INGOs	and	the	GO	were	not	analysed	as	intensively	as	Medair	due	to	timely	
limitations.	 The	 behaviour	 of	 people	 was	 analysed	 only	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 condition	 for	 the	
implementation	of	recommendations	in	order	to	know	how	the	intervention	shall	be	approached	
(Rosenstiel	2010	model).	However,	the	question	of	how	people	share	information	and	why	could	
not	be	analysed.	The	thesis	only	slightly	touched	information	management,	thus	not	being	in	the	
focus.	The	difficulty	consisted	in	the	application	of	the	vague	definition	of	information	flow.	It	was	
seen	as	an	aspect	of	information	management	and	the	delimitation	was	done	in	regards	to	time	
(ten	 first	 weeks)	 and	 exchange	 between	 specific	 functions	 (HQ	 and	 FO,	 logistics	 and	 project	
information).		
6.3 Implications	for	Practitioners	and	Theory	
Generally	valid,	it	can	be	said	that	good	management	is	a	condition	to	regulate	information	flow	
in	emergency	relief.	Additionally,	technical	and	behavioural	skills	trainings	are	a	prerequisite	for	
experienced	workers	in	operations	and	therefore	improve	information	flow.	A	discovery	is	that	
many	impediments	to	information	flow	can	be	mitigated	or	alleviated	by	managerial	decisions	
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and	project	management	tools	such	as	trainings.	Only	a	small	portion	of	impediments	caused	by	
situational	 circumstances	 cannot	 be	 influenced	 simply.	 However,	 the	 improvement	
recommendations	within	 the	 conditions	 of	empowerment	 and	 obligation,	 individual	 skills	 and	
individual	 desire	 can	 be	 influenced	 to	 enable	 a	 better	 flow	 of	 information.	 It	 is	 therefore	
encouraging	that	organisations	have	the	power	to	change	conditions	themselves,	enabling	their	
staff	to	work	with	better	communication	tools	in	a	complex	environment.	Some	of	the	ideas	on	
how	to	improve	information	flow	can	be	found	in	the	booklet	intended	for	practitioners	(section	
5.3).	
Regarding	theory,	 this	paper	contributes	to	 the	body	of	knowledge	specifically	on	 information	
flow.	 It	 exclusively	 focused	 on	 information	 flow	 within	 INGOs.	 The	 thesis	 validates	 certain	
impediments	to	information	flow	and	provides	some	scientific	improvement	suggestions	through	
its	practical	approach.		
6.4 General	Learnings		
In	 literature,	 we	 find	 a	 considerable	 emphasis	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 information	 flow	
improvement	 and	 the	 efficiency	 and	 performance	 of	 supply	 chains.	 However,	 a	 concept	 on	
information	flow	and	by	what	it	is	influenced	seems	to	be	vaguely	defined.	It	could	be	said	that	
the	method	how	IF	can	be	improved	appears	to	be	left	to	practitioners,	namely	the	concerned	
teams	in	those	organisations.		
The	organisation	involved	in	the	process	mapping	was	motivated	to	learn	from	the	interaction.	
During	the	meeting,	several	evaluations	and	learnings	from	the	Haiti	response	were	mentioned.	
Later	on,	 the	 results	 from	 the	mapping	were	of	 interest	 for	quality	 improvement.	Hence,	 the	
process	mapping	meeting	contributed	to	the	reflection	process	on	how	to	improve	emergency	
relief	in	general.		
6.5 Further	Research	
The	 findings	 are	 a	 considerable	 gain,	 pointing	 out	 specific	 areas	 of	 intervention	 to	 improve	
information	flows	and	thereby	foster	efficiency	in	emergency	relief	operations.	The	topic	needs	
further	development:	Research	demand	exists	in	terms	of	concept	definition	of	information	flow	
and	testing	of	the	proposed	approaches.	It	 is	known	that	improved	information	flow	advances	
material	 flow	and	this	paper	established	suggestions	of	approaches	to	the	 improvement	of	 IF.	
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However,	 the	 findings	 remain	 to	 be	 validated:	 Does	 improved	 IF	 really	 result	 in	 better	
organisational	performance?	At	the	same	time,	concept	development	in	terms	of	what	is	good	
organisational	performance	 in	humanitarian	 relief,	 is	of	extended	value.	Possibly	a	 case	 study	
examining	 performance	 of	 an	 organisation	 in	 which	 logistics	 is	 a	 strategic	 function	 can	 be	
compared	to	a	case	where	logistics	is	only	a	support	function.	Through	this	study,	the	influence	
of	 the	 position	 of	 logistics	 upon	 performance	 could	 be	 tested.	 Other	 extended	 topics	 like	
information	 management	 systems	 in	 emergency	 relief	 would	 be	 valuable	 to	 investigate.	
Potentially,	this	can	be	done	through	a	case	study	with	the	analysis	of	two	similar	organisations.	
	
	
	
	
	
«Process	improvement	is	not	a	destination.	It	is	a	journey	
without	end.	With	this	feature,	it	is	similar	to	the	work	of	
brave	humanitarians,	trying	to	make	a	difference.	They	
work	in	a	chaotic,	dangerous,	volatile	world;	a	world	
without	end.	Amen.»  
Tatham	and	Christopher,	2014,	p.	34	
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8.2 Impediments	Categorised	into	Conditions	of	Behaviour	
Empowerment	and	obligation		
o Inaccessibility	
o Cultural	conflicts		
o Source	identification	difficulty		
o Unreliability		
o HQ	does	not	understand	the	field		
o Online	system	not	being	used	much	&	data	in	
online	system	is	not	up	to	date	
o Low	information	priority	
o Storage	media	misalignment		
o Not	everyone	is	in	the	information	loop		
o Overworked	staff	&	not	time	for	IS		
o Coordination	costs		
o Inconsistent	data	and	information	formats	
o Roles	and	responsibilities	are	not	clear		
o Need	to	standardise		
o Lack	of	sense	of	ownership	for	decisions		
Individual	desire		
o High	staff	turnover	
o Cultural	conflicts		
o Info	access	depends	on	interpersonal	
relationships		
o HQ	does	not	understand	the	field		
o Online	system	not	being	used	much	&	Data	in	
online	system	is	not	up	to	date	
o Not	everyone	is	in	the	information	loop		
Situational	enabling		
o Urgent	responsiveness	
o Extreme	uncertainty		
o Short	supply	chain	life-cycle		
o Inadequate	stream	of	information	
o Complex	environment		
o Many	stakeholders	&	demands	of	donor	
accountability	and	transparency		
o Low	information	priority		
o Storage	media	misalignment		
Individual	skills		
o Lack	of	skilled	logistics	worker		
o Cultural	conflicts		
o Source	identification	difficulty	
o Inadequate	stream	of	information		
o HQ	does	not	understand	the	field		
o Online	system	not	being	used	much	&	Data	in	
online	system	is	not	up	to	date	
o Lack	of	process	knowledge		
o Not	everyone	is	in	the	information	loop		
o Overworked	staff	&	not	time	for	IS		
o Coordination	costs	
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8.3 Experts	Overview	Table		
	
Klasien	Hoeve,	
Medair
Andreas	Müller,	
Medair
Joel	Kaiser,	Medair
Maurane	
Tschibambe,	
Medair
Jonathan	Genet,	
Medair
Charity	Watson,	
Medair
Organisation	
(during	ERO)
Medair	(Interview) Medair	(Interview) Medair Medair Medair Medair
Job	title
International	Logistics	
Manager	HQ
Warehouse	Manager	
Regional	hub	Juba
Head	of	Global	
Emergency	Response
Emergency	Response	
Team	Assistant
Logistics	Officer
Communications	&	
Information	
Management	Officer
Work	
experience
9	years	 2	years 15	years 2	years 5	years
1.5y	hum.,	4y	Int.	
Dev.
Formal	level	of	
education
Master	(Eqivalent) Master Master
Bachelor	in	
humanitarian	logistics
Bachelor
Disaster-Mng	
related	
education
No
FEMA	Emergency	
Management	
Institute	diploma
No
Logistics	response	
Tean	training	from	
the	Logistics	Cluster
Humanitarian	Core	
Competancies	
Certificate	from	
Humanitarian	U,	
including	disaster	
management	
modules
Specific	IM	
system	at	your	
Org?
No No No No
Portfolio	(programs),	
Box	(sharing	
documents),	
Qlik	View	(report	and	
visualize	data)
Developing	new	tools	
of	info	collection	
(mobile	data	
collection,	GIS	
mapping,	visual	
dashboards	and	
consistent	
communication	from	
country	mngt.	
Different	IM	systems	
in	differing	stages	of	
dev..
Relief	
Operation
Haiti	Oct	2016 SDS	2015 Haiti	Oct	2016 Haiti	Oct	2016 Haiti	Oct	2016
Central	Highlands,	
Afghanistan	-	Massive	
wheat	crop	losses
Function Logistics	Manager
Emergency	Response	
Team	Leader
Emergency	Response	
Team	Assistant,	in	
charge	of	information	
management	and	
internal	
communication
Logistics	Officer,	in	
charge	of	supplying	
the	goods	to	the	
disaster	area	
(temporary	base)
Information	
Management	
Officer/Interim	
Project	Manager
HQ	or	FO HQ FO Field HQ Field Field
Counterpart
Logistics	Manager	
Field
Not	often	contact	to	
HQ
Head	of	Global	
Emergency	Response
No	direct	
counterpart,	mainly	
supporting	the	Head	
of	Emergency	
Responses.	An	
Information	
Management	Officer	
was	my	counterpart	
in	FO	for	a	few	
months.
International	Logistics	
Manager	HQ
Head	of	Country	
Programme,	Logs	+	
Fin	Officer,	and	IM	
Manager	for	digital	
data	collection	(IM	
pilot)
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Stefano	Biagiotti,	
ICRC
Daniel	Jutzi,	MAF
Vaughan	
Woodward,	MAF
Flisch	Jörimann,	
SDC
Olivia	Mathys,	
(jetzt	Caritas)
Yvonne	Affolter,	
SRK
Organisation	
(during	ERO)
ICRC MAF MAF SDC	(SHA) (n/a) SRK	/	Caritas	
Job	title
Deputy	Log	
Coordinator
Disaster	Response	
Manager
Global	Disaster	
Response	Deputy	
Manager
Programme	Officer	
Rapid	Resonse
Project	Manager
Program	Coordinator	
(NPL	Earthquake	and	
Ukraine,	SRK)
Work	
experience
3	years 22	years 16	years 12	years 4	years 7	years
Formal	level	of	
education
Master Master Master Master Master Master
Disaster-Mng	
related	
education
No Crisis	Management On	the	job	training - -
PM	diplomas	and	
certificates,	
Leadership	trainings,	
specific	mngt	fields	
trainings	(fin,	
security,	HR,	
controlling	etc.)
Specific	IM	
system	at	your	
Org?
Lotus	Note	-	IBM no no
DMS	
Datamanagement	
System	for	archiving
corporate	driver,	
SAGA	(project	
management	tool,	
incl.	finances)
Navision/Betriebsdat
enerfassung	for	
finance-related	info,	
sharepoint	/oneDrive	
for	documents
Relief	
Operation
Unity	State,	South	
Sudan	/	Nov	2016	/	
Emergency	Food	
Distribution
Nepal	Earthquake	
2015
Haiti	Oct	2016 Haiti	Oct	2016
Mardin,	Turkey,	
Sept2015
Haiyan	PHL	Nov	2013
Function
Log	Delegate	-	
Warehouse	and	
Planning
Initial	Response	
Project	Manager
Disaster	Response	
Manager
Chief	of	staff	at	the	
crisis	cell
Programme	Manager
Disaster	Response	
Delegate
HQ	or	FO Delegation	(Field	HQ) Field Field HQ Field
Field	(first	5	months),	
then	HQ
Counterpart
Head	of	Sub	
Delegation
Response	Manager	
and	Admin	Support	
Officer
Global	Disaster	
Response	Manager	
and	Lead	Disater	
Response	
Administrator
No	direct	oral	
communication	to	FO	
(but	btw.	Head	of	
crisis	cel	and	Team	
Leader	of	relief	team)
Chief	of	Operations Program	Coordinator	
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8.4 Interview	Results	Table	
	
Structure Emergency	and	recovery	
Budget:	60	Mio
Matrix	organizations	with	support	functions	(Fin,	HR,	Logs,	IT)	
Logistics	comprises	seven	areas	(Procurement,	stock	mngt,	
transport,	travel,	equipment	tracking,	fleet	tracking	and	facilities)	
and	is	a	linkage	to	programs	and	all	support	functions,	fits	into	the	
overall	PM.
We	hire	people	without	much	experience	and	puts	them	in	a	
responsible	role.	Training	takes	therefore	much	time	(matrix	
organisation,	donor	requirements,	project	mngt	etc.)
Training	before	field:	1w	orientation	course	(behaviour)	+	4d	log,	
procurement	etc.	introduction
As	Warehouse	mngr,	I	was	not	involved	in	much	communication	to	
HQ.	
However,	managing	1200	different	itemas	and	5	reporting	staff	
complicated	the	task.
Standard	processes	had	do	be	re-implemented	in	the	first	3-4	
months	(Stock	Report,	Receipt	of	Goods,	Journal).
Hierarchy:	Country	Director	->	Deputy	country	Director	->	Logistics	
Manager	->	Supply	Chain	Manager	->	Warehouse	Manager	(me)	->	
Warehouse	Assistances
only	CD	talks	to	HQ	Head	of	country	program,	others	talk	to	their	
support	function	at	HQ	if	needed
Assessment HQ:	receiving	information	with	different	platforms	such	as	Virtual	
OSOCC,	logs	Cluster,	internal	information	Manager
FO:	assessment	combined	with	assisting,	through	one	team	1w
Procurement Often	not	many	suppliers	to	choose	from.
All	the	time	we	had	delays.
Readyness	
for	change
IT	is	always	behind.	But	in	ERT,	people	find	their	way	around	it.	
Secure	data	lines	are	costly	and	too	slow.	Limiting	factor	is	mainly	
money,	then	technical	capacity.	
smoothly,	step	by	step	after	the	involvement	of	several	
stakeholder.	Explain	improvements	and	encourage	staff	and	
capacity	building
Communicati
on
Skype,	Emails,	Whatsapp,	Meetings,	phone	calls	(usually	with	the	
field->report	by	HQ	log).	Field	decides	when	and	if.	
EMR:	skilled	log	will	discuss	about	operational	logistics,	if	cross-
covering	other	roles	also	these	roles	(Staffing,	schedules,	
organizing,	GiK	etc.)
Ongoing:	follow-up	and	recommendations	
Humanitarian	individuals:	"humanitarians	are	like	water.	They	will	
always	try	to	make	things	work,	but	they	will	try	to	take	the	
shortcut.	Even	if	you	have	a	process	in	place	or	you	agreed	to	do	
something	in	a	certain	way,	they	will	decide	to	do	things	whichever	
way	is	the	quickest	and	the	easiest.	good	for	reacting	quickly,	but	
loosing	on	the	structural	side.	
e.g.	agreement	on	pull-system,	but	then	everyone	changes	to	a	
push-system	(In	the	heat	of	the	moment	people	go	in	and	push	
things	out,	a	soap	instead	of	a	blanket).	/	forget	reporting	back"
Through	email,	intranet,	personal,	meetings.
In	SDS,	training	is	not	self-evident/self-responsibly
IM	systems	
and	tools
Excel	for	actual	transactions	(procurement)	/	Excel	&	Portfolio	for	
reporting	and	tracking
However,	this	is	just	an	empty	box,	Excel	can	meet	the	needs	of	
logs,	but	not	of	the	entire	organization.	A	overall	tool	with	
dashboards	for	managers	would	be	helpful.
=>	We	would	need	 a	tool	which	links	all	that 	(e.g.	when	entering	
an	information,	the	system	realizes	this	impacts	someone	else	as	
well)
No	IM	system.	Only	Excel.	Essential	information	from	HQ	is	shared.	
=>	More	trust	about	individual	skills	would	be	helpful	and	
timesaving.
Checklists,	
handbooks,	
guidelines
Checklists	are	good,	but	they	require	a	lot	of	training.	Because	we	
work	with	temporaries,	this	is	not	possible.
Quick	reference	cards,	internal	process	docs,	books	and	self-
produced	checklists	were	very	helpful.
Trainings one	week	Briefing	at	HQ,	within	that	two	days	to	train	people	on	
logistics.	Important	that	they	understand	Logs	is	a	function	that	
needs	to	be	involved	everywhere	along	the	project	cycle	(even	
before	starting	to	think	of	a	project),	from	project	design	to	donor	
reports.
not	enough	time	for	training	->	lack	of	skilled	workers
Meetings 1/d	in	first	two	to	three	weeks,	then	every	other	day,	twice	a	week,	
once	per	week	dropping	down	to	once	a	month,	also	depends	on	
the	logs	mngr	in	the	field.	It's	possible	that	this	person	covers	two	
or	more	functions	(finances,	communications	etc.)
Emails,	intranet,	docs	on	servers,	personal	meetings,	regular	group	
(every	second	week)	and	mngt	meetings	
Team	work Temporary	staff:	little	accountability,	sometimes	less	experienced.
-	Simplification	might	not	always	work	(stressed,	insecure,	tired	
people)
=>	Repetition	and	score	would	be	helpful
if	local	staff	are	initiative	and	have	good	networks,	speak	the	
language,	they	can	be	key	for	work
Structured	thinking	is	very	different	CH	to	SDS,	however	CH	
structure	also	helped	the	locals.	Not	sure	what	still	remains	
though.	
Sometimes	log	knowhow	was	not	there,	but	the	cultural	
understanding.	However,	everyone	needs	to	show	flexibility.
Stakeholder Sharing	information	with	Management,	staff,	subcontractor,	
suppliers,	field	locations,	program	managers,	other	international	
colleagues
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l	s
tr
uc
tu
re
Co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n
Pe
op
le
Questions	in	the	
interview
Medair
Logistics	Manager	HQ
(HQ,	ongoing	and	rapid	response)
Skype	Interview
Medair	
Warehouse	Manager	South	Sudan
(ongoing	emergency)
Questions	sent	via	email,	Skype	interview	for	clarification
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Information	
sharing	
impediments
Encountered	problems:	when	communication	tools	don't	work,	
too	much	is	going	on,	time	difference,	experience	&	Knowledge	of	
people,	not	knowing	what	is	relevant	for	the	field/HQ	to	know,	
who	to	contact	in	a	certain	situation,	excitement	involves	everyone	
(too	many	people	on	the	table),	information	overload.
=>	information	management	role	was	added	to	distribute	
information	
=>	standing	meeting	will	be	introduced	with	only	necessary	
functions
Security:	Concern	is	usually	about	beneficiary	data,	but	not	on	
information	exchange	between	HQ	and	FO
No	structure	nor	processes	(e.g.Stock	cards	got	lost).	Visits	from	
mng	and	logs	advisors	helped	to	install	processes	step	by	step	
=>	install	opening	hours	(+communicate	it	to	procurement),	
trainings	
=>	install	stock	cards,	push	for	keeping	up	the	processes	
=>	4	eyes	principle
=>	Layout	warehouse	and	document	structure
Complexity:	"PHL:	corruption,	nepotism,	thefts,	insecurity	(traffic),	
unfavourable	contracts,	landlord	rights,
SDS:	insecurity,	thefts,	governmental	bureaucracy,	military	
movements,	looting	of	Organisation's	property,	MedEvac,	staff	
absence	caused	by	illness,	insecure	roads,	cancelled	flight	due	to	
many	reasons	(weather,	insecurity,	governmental	regulations),	
labour	mafia,	political	volatility	sometimes	made	work	impossible"
=>	need	to	be	flexible	and	improvise	
Improvement	
ideas
	=>	Clear	roles	and	responsibilities,	clear	processes,	clear	PM	
procedures,	regular	trainings,	tests,	clear	career	development,	
easy	to	use	tools,	more	measurements	of	what	we	are	doing,	
management	skills
=>	a	cloud	system	is	only	a	tool,	it	needs	to	be	thought	through	
(who	needs	what	info,	how	to	put	it	in	so	that	it	makes	sense	for	
everyone)
=>	find	out	how	to	work	best	across-functions	as	we	are	a	matrix	
organisation.
	=>install	opening	hours	(+communicate	it	to	procurement),	
trainings	
=>	install	stock	cards,	push	for	keeping	up	the	processes	
=>	4	eyes	principle
=>	Layout	warehouse	and	document	structure
=>	on-	and	offline	Cloud	system	
=>	best	would	be	a	system	where	every	article	has	its	code	and	
number	linked	to	a	easy-to-handle	system
=>	More	time	in	HQ	with	logs	and	IT	staff
=>	staff	training,	capacity	building	(also	in	computer	systems,	
tracking	system)
=>	control	implementation,	sanctions	if	procedures	get	lost
Learning	
methods
_(MLogs)	Well	structured	Factsheets	in	a	booklet
_(MERT)	In	a	training,	I	found	out	that	there	is	a	huge	diversity	on	
how	people	learn.	I	was	surprised	that	everyone	learns	very	
differently;	some	want	to	read,	others	needed	to	do	it,	others	
solely	listened	to	the	powerpoint.	ERT:	in	the	process	of	doing.	
Triplex	simulation.	Not	real	life,	but	simulations	were	best.
Ask	staff	or	line-manager,	cellphone	call,	email,	download	from	
internet,	discussions	in	meetings	
Format	 Combination	of	cloud	and	app	(online	and	offline)	would	be	useful.	
where	you	can	store	a	lot	of	information,	guidelines,	Quick	
reference	cards,	processes	etc..	A	printed	handbook	does	not	work	
anymore,	Quick	reference	cards	are	useful	and	checklists	also	good	
to	have.
_(MLogs)	Quick	Reference	Cards	(internal)	very	useful	-	but	some	
procedures	are	skipped	in	emergencies.	
ERT	is	working	on	an	emergency	handbook	-	an	integration	of	
these	findings	could	be	useful.
Booklet	would	be	the	most	useful:	II	(our	logs	used	MSF	guidelines	
for	distribution)
Apps:	depends	really	on	technology,	too	many	apps	on	a	phone,	
needs	internet.
_(MERT)	Simulations	(Beer	game	was	good)	and	secondly	a	small	
booklet	(very	concise,	eventually	with	case	studies)
Mixture	of	different	e-documents	(pdf,	word,	video-clips,	podcasts,	
audio)	on	a	cloud	/	intranet	which	is	easy	to	use	(drag	and	drop)
Content:	Best	practices,	quick	links	or	checklists	could	help
Book	would	be	too	thick
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Structure Rapid	Response	Fachstelle	deckt	alle	Nothilfe	ab,	auch	Afrika.	
KMZ:	Krisenmanagement	Zentrum:	kümmert	sich	um	alle	
Schweizer	im	Katastrophengebiet.
Soforthilfe-Budget:	500	Mio	pro	Jahr,	2%	des	DEZA	
Gesamtbudgets.	1/3	an	IKRIK,	1/3	UNHCR,	1/3	eigene	Response	
SKH	Mitglieder	(RRT):	650	P.,	jede	Funktion	mind.	5	mal	vertreten,	
um	immer	verfügbare	Experten	bereit	zu	haben.	Chef	HH	Manuel	
Bessler	ist	wärend	einer	RR	für	zwei	Monate	direkt	dem	Bundesrat	
unterstellt	(keine	DEZA-Zwischenstufe	dazwischen),	also	direkte	
Entscheidungskraft	(ob	RR	oder	nicht)
Involvement	of	local	embassy	is	always	crucial,	it	is	a	cooperation	
between	RRT	and	embassy,	HQ	CH	decides.	
->	Struktur	hilft	sehr
Assessment Feld:	werden	grob	und	community-based	durchgeführt.	
Verteilungen	ans	ganze	Dorf	(wenn	auch	an	Reiche),	da	keine	Zeit	
für	Details,	und	das	Verteilen	an	alle	ist	wichtig	für	die	Sicherheit.
Procurement Haiti:	Einkauf	war	sehr	schwierig,	da	keine	Zulieferer,	darum	über	
Dom.Rep.	Früher	hatte	man	3	Flieger	mit	Material	gefüllt	(heute		
immer	noch	möglich,		einfach	teuer	und	kommt	später	an).	
Prepositioning	ist	grosses	Thema
Readyness	
for	change
Communicati
on
MAF	DR	Mngr:	Verantwortung	vom	Project	Manager	der	DR.	Bei	
DFID	sind	wir	schon	preaprouved,	müssen	also	nicht	mehr	
grundsätzliche	Prozesse	erklären.	Man	fragt	DFID	an	wenn	sie	vor	
Ort	sind,	reicht	ein	schlankes	Projektproposal	ein	und	in	der	Regel	
funktioniert	dies	sehr	gut.	Das	Reporting	funktioniert	relativ	
einfach:	Die	Leistung	wird	in	geflogenen	Stunden	berechnet	(X	
Flugstunden	für	X	Geld),	plus	Kostenaufstellung.	Falls	wir	
effizienter	arbeiten,	fliegen	wir	mehr	für	dieses	Geld.
From	HQ	to	FO,	only	Head	of	crisis	cell	and	Teamleader	of	relief	
team	exchange	information	(Sit.rep.	And	debriefing	sheets).	
Wichtig:	TL	Feld	zusammenarbeit	mit	Botschafter	Feld!
Entscheidungsablauf:	RR	Concept	defines	clear	lines	of	
communication:	
1.	Vor	RR	(Decision	to	go):	Piketdienst	->	Entscheidung	ob	
Einsatzleitung	formiert	wird	zw.	Piket,	Chef	HH,	geografischer	Chef	-
>	SMS	an	22	Pers.	(Haiti)	->	Einsatzleitung	formiert
2.	Während	RR:	Einsatzleiter	CH	entscheidet,	weil	Geld	aus	der	CH	
gesprochen	wird.	nur	TL	Feld	kommuniziert	mit	HQ.	Meistens	nickt	
Einsatzleiter	CH	Entscheidungen	ab.
Konsens	muss	bereits	am	Anfang	mit	der	Botschaft	getroffen	
werden,	da	diese	nach	2	Monaten	Programm	übernehmen.	Bei	
den	Trainings	ist	die	Sensibilisierung	auf	die	Kommunikation	mit	
den	Botschaften	wichtig.	FIeld	Manual	erklärt	Hierarchien	und	Job	
Descriptions.	Lessons	Learnt	nach	Evaluation	werden	integriert	
(working	document)
IM	systems	
and	tools
Working	via	email	across	multiple	time	zones	slows	the	
communication	process	/	Moving	large	picture	or	video	files	via	
email	difficult	due	to	server	limitations	on	file	sizes	/	file	share	
utilities	such	as	drop-box,	take	time	&	speed	is	limited	by	
bandwidth	and	local	internet	connectivity.	Pre-paid	phones	for	
local	comms,	have	limitations	on	international	connectivity	&	data	
transfer.	Costs	of	BGAN,	sat	phones	and	international	phone	calls,	
though	not	a	large	impediment	(needs	to	be	managed).
GATR	or	VSAT	units	require	specialist	technicians	to	set-up	+	cost	
and	delay,	but	allow	greater	freedom	of	IF.	Biggest	need	is	to	get	
info	to	fundraisers	ASAP,	often	with	detail	and	human	interest	
stories,		often	it's	the	Response	Manager	(takes	a	lot	of	time	&	
energy	away	from	managing	the	response	actions)
Datanmanagemens	System	for	archiving	(DMS):	
Informationsablage	für	jegliche	Kommunikation.	HQ	legt	ab,	Feld	
schreibt	Sit.Reps	und	speichert	auf	lokalem	Server.
Checklists,	
handbooks,	
guidelines
MAF	DR	Mngr:	Wir	sind	Aviatiker,	wir	operieren	mit	Checklisten	
und	sind	schnell	bereit,	uns	daran	zu	halten.	Dies	ist	in	unseren	
Genen,	wir	würden	keine	Abkürzungen	nehmen	(wie	vielleicht	
humanitäres	Personal).	Die	Prozesse	zu	formalisieren	hilft	uns.	
Field	manual	beschreibt	Hierarchie,	Job	describtions	etc.	
Evaluationen	werden	nach	dem	Einsatz	integiert	(Working	
document)
Trainings 26	Trainings	pro	Jahr	(Keine	Briefing-Zeit	vor	Einsätzen).
Meetings Kommunikation	(hängt	auch	von	den	Personen	ab):	Telefon	1-2/d,	
sit.rep:	1/d
Team	work Decision	making:	RR	Concept	defines	clear	lines	of	communication.	
Head	of	response	HQ	decides	with	information	from	TL	field
Depending	on	emergency,	getting	information	from	
Erdbebendienst	ZH,	different	int.	Services,	embassies	etc..	
Circumstances	and	Construction	of	houses	determines	if	USAR	is	
set	to	go	or	not	required	to	be	there	48h	after	emergency).
Stakeholder MAF	DR	Mngr:	Es	gelten	verschiedene	Prinzipien:	First	come,	first	
served,	strategische	Partner	werden	auch	beachtet,	und	die	
dringendsten	Hilfsgüter	zuerst.
Reporting:	MAF	DR	Mngr:	Verantwortung	vom	Project	Manager	
der	DR.	Bei	DFID	sind	wir	schon	preaprouved,	müssen	also	nicht	
mehr	grundsätzliche	Prozesse	erklären.	Man	fragt	DFID	an	wenn	
sie	vor	Ort	sind,	reicht	ein	schlankes	Projektproposal	ein	und	in	der	
Regel	funktioniert	dies	sehr	gut.	Das	Reporting	funktioniert	relativ	
einfach:	Die	Leistung	wird	in	geflogenen	Stunden	berechnet	(X	
Flugstunden	für	X	Geld),	plus	Kostenaufstellung.	Falls	wir	
effizienter	arbeiten,	fliegen	wir	mehr	für	dieses	Geld.
DEZA	hat	grosses	Aussennetz	(Botschaften,	Schweizer	NGOs,	
Fernseh,	etc.),	worauf	das	RRT	zurückgreifen	kann.	Zugang	zum	
Land	ist	eine	politische	Einladungsfrage	(erschwert	zum	Teil).	Drei	
Rollen:	die	offizielle	Schweiz,	Responders,	Donors)
Mandatsklärung	ist	wichtig:	Botschaft	hat	anderes	Mandat	und	
Interessen	wie	das	RRT	(bzgl.	Regionen,	politischer	Einfluss	etc.	
RRT	hilft	wo	die	Not	am	grössten	ist).	Als	Verantwortlicher	
Einsatzleitung	mache	ich	oft	zusammen	mit	KMZ	Trainings	und	wir	
informieren	die	Botschaften	zusammen	über	unsere	Aktivitäten	
und	arbeiten	Scenarios	aus.	Zuständigkeiten	erklären
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Questions	in	the	
interview
MAF
Disaster	Response	Manager
(rapid	onset)
Phone	and	email	conversations	(two	respondents)
DEZA	-	SKH
Fachstelle	Rapid	Response
(rapid	onset)
Personal	interview	
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Information	
sharing	
impediments
Inaccessibility	of	information:	Schwierig,	da	RRT	nur	durch	BGAN	
Daten	transferieren	konnte	(keine	Antennen)	->	nur	kleine	
Datenmengen	konnten	transportiert	werden.
"Catastrophies	are	very	different,	one	to	the	other	is	not	
comparable.	The	Philippines	(supplier	next	door)	cannot	be	
compared	to	Haiti	(no	suppliers)
Je	nachdem	wie	das	Zwischenmenschliche	funktioniert,	hängt	
vieles	davon	ab."
Improvement	
ideas
	=>	Aim	at	mobilising	GATR	or	VSAT	units	early	with	appropriate	
technical	staff	-	not	loosing	time	is	priority	to	wasting	a	plane	ticket	
(DR	concept)
=>	Sending	pics	and	videos	on	storage	sticks	with	travelling	staff
=>	Use	BGAN	units	and	allocate	communication	costs	in	a	funding	
application
=>	Employ	media	specialists	to	gather	stories,	relieving	the	
response	manager.
Learning	
methods
Format	 Content	should	be	shared	in	form	of	a	training.	Fachübergreifende	
Trainings	sind	zentral.
We	integrate	learnings	from	evaluations	directly	in	the	field	
manual	already.	2016,	we	developped	two	new	trainings	on	
assessments,	2017	an	NFI	(assessment	to	procurement)	training
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In	which	format	should	these	improvement	ideas	be	packed	into?
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Questionnaire	
Information	flow	in	humanitarian	operations	
	
General	information	
ZHAW	MSc	Business	Administration	–	Major	Nonprofit	and	Public	Management.		
Master	thesis	of	Andrea	Rominger	(rudinan2@students.zhaw.ch)	
	
Background	of	study	
This	study	analyses	information	flow	between	Headquarters	and	field	office	in	emergency	relief	operations.	It	
aims	 to	 find	 out	 what	 the	 impediments	 to	 information	 flow	 are	 and	 how	 these	 can	 be	 improved.	 This	
questionnaire	helps	to	verify	impediments	found	in	other	studies	and	recent	literature.		
	
Confidentiality	
All	personal	information	given	will	be	kept	confidential.	Only	your	function	and	organization	will	be	mentioned,	
your	Name	will	not	appear.	Your	statements	will	not	be	linked	to	your	organization	or	function.	If	you	wish	
that	your	function	shall	not	be	mentioned	as	well,	please	let	me	know.		
	
Practical	things	
All	Participants	receive	a	final	copy	of	the	paper	in	July	(2017).	The	completion	of	the	questionnaire	will	take	
around	15	minutes.	Practical	descriptions	and	concrete	examples	of	situations	are	helpful.	
	
	
Part	1:	Personal	Information	
(1)		What	is	your	job	title?	
(2)		How	many	years	of	work	experience	do	you	have	in	humanitarian	operations?		
(3)		What	is	your	formal	level	of	education	(e.g.	Bachelor	degree,	Master	degree)?	
(4)		Do	you	have	any	disaster-management	related	education?	If	yes,	please	specify:	
(5)		Does	your	organization	use	a	specific	information	management	system?	If	yes,	please	specify:	
	
In	order	to	fill	in	the	following	table,	it	is	essential	to	have	one	specific	emergency	relief	operation	in	mind.	Try	
to	answer	the	questions	looking	only	at	the	first	two	weeks	of	the	disaster.	Please	choose	a	relief	operation:	
- Which	you	can	recall	well	
- Where	you	were	actively	involved	the	first	two	weeks	of	the	disaster	
- Where	you	were	either	at	Headquarters	communicating	with	the	field,	or	part	of	the	emergency	relief	
team	communicating	back	to	Headquarters.	
	
(1) Which	emergency	relief	operation	are	you	thinking	of?	Location	and	date		
(2) What	was	your	function?		
(3) Where	you	positioned	at	Headquarters	or	in	a	field	office?		
(4) Who	was	your	counterpart	in	the	field	office	(if	you	were	at	Headquarters)	or	at	Headquarters	(if	you	
were	in	a	field	office)?		
	
	
Part	2:	Table	
The	following	table	shows	impediments	to	information	flow,	including	a	short	explanation.	Thinking	of	the	
relief	operation	you	noted,	please	choose	whether	you	have	experienced	this	being	an	obstacle	to	
information	flow	and	how	frequently	(rarely,	sometimes,	often).		
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(4) Who	was	your	counterpart	in	the	field	office	(if	you	were	at	Headquarters)	or	at	Headquarters	(if	you	
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Part	2:	Table	
The	following	table	shows	impediments	to	information	flow,	including	a	short	explanation.	Thinking	of	the	
relief	operation	you	noted,	please	choose	whether	you	have	experienced	this	being	an	obstacle	to	
information	flow	and	how	frequently	(rarely,	sometimes,	often).		
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	 	 (1)	=	Rarely	
(3)	=	
Sometimes	
(5)	=		
Often	
Urgency	
The	urgent	responsiveness	of	the	disaster	
environment	influenced	information	sharing.	
E.g.	Too	much	organization	on	site,	no	time	to	
communicate	this	to	HQ.	
	 	 	
Extreme	
uncertainty	
Receiving	information	of	uncertain	quality	
(regarding	demand,	supply	and	assessment).	
	 	 	
Short	supply	chain	
life-cycle	
Processes	are	rapidly	created	and	modified	with	
little	time	to	formalize	associated	information	
flows.	
	 	 	
Complex	
environment	
The	complexity	and	chaotic	nature	of	managing	
information	flows.	
	 	 	
Many	stakeholders	
&	demands	
Donors	have	become	influential	in	prompting	
humanitarian	organizations	to	think	in	terms	of	
greater	donor	accountability	and	transparency.	
	 	 	
Inaccessibility	
Physical	non-availability	of	information	
(Information	system	break	downs,	unprepared	
data).	
	 	 	
Unreliability	
An	organization's	low	level	of	confidence	in	the	
quality	of	data	or	information	it	possesses.	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	 (1)	=	Rarely	
(3)	=	
Sometimes	
(5)	=		
Often	
Structure	
Centralized	(decisions	made	at	HQ)	or	
decentralized	(decisions	made	in	the	field	
location).			
	 	 	
Need	to	standardize	 Processes	are	not	standardized.	 	 	 	
Lack	of	sense	of	
ownership	for	
decisions	
Ambiguity	leads	to	people	not	taking	
responsibility	for	certain	decisions.		
	 	 	
Roles	and	
responsibilities	are	
not	clear	
Ambiguity	leads	to	people	not	taking	
responsibility	for	certain	tasks.		
	 	 	
Lack	of	process	
knowledge	
Uncertainty	about	the	role	makes	it	unclear	
who	should	be	involved	in	which	
communications.	
	 	 	
Low	information	
priority	
Failure	to	place	appropriate	priority	on	
information	sharing.	
	 	 	
Source	
Identification	
difficulty	
Not	knowing	where	to	obtain	data	or	
information.		
	 	 	
	 	
1. Emergency	Setting	
2.	Organisational	Structure	
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(1)	=	
Rarely	
(3)	=	
Sometimes	
(5)	=		
Often	
Inadequate	stream	
of	information	
Shortage	or	overload	of	information.	 	 	 	
Storage	media	
misalignment	
Information	storage	inherently	constrains	
efficient	information	flow	activities.	
	 	 	
Need	of	robust	
equipment	
Condition	of	technology	and	the	definition	of	
manual	processes.		
	 	 	
Inconsistent	data	
and	information	
formats	
The	sources	are	not	consistent,	or	definitions	
vary.	People	"play	safe"	by	taking	the	highest	
number	and	go	with	that.	
	 	 	
Online	system	not	
being	used	much		
Leading	to	data	in	online	system	not	being	up	
to	date,	fragmented	&	stored	in	too	many	
places.	
	 	 	
	
	
	 	
(1)	=	
Rarely	
(3)	=	
Sometimes	
(5)	=		
Often	
Overworked	staff	&	
no	time	for	
information	sharing	
Feedback/Reporting	is	less	of	a	priority.	 	 	 	
Information	access	
depends	on	
interpersonal	
relationship	
Due	to	uncertainty,	staff	improvise	and	
establish	unofficial	channels	of	communication.	
	 	 	
Language	barriers	
Not	understanding	a	language	can	make	
people	not	attending	a	meeting	
	 	 	
HQ	does	not	
understand	the	field	
HQ	is	too	far	from	field	reality.	 	 	 	
Unwillingness	
When	one	person	decides	not	to	transfer	data	
or	information	to	another	person	(due	to	
regulatory	law	constraints	or	personal	
preference).	
	 	 	
	
	 	
4.	Behavior	
	
3.	Information	Systems	
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	 	 (1)	=	Rarely	
(3)	=	
Sometimes	
(5)	=		
Often	
Staff	turnover	
(emergency	phase)	
When	staff	leave,	not	all	relevant	information	is	
shared	with	the	replacement.		
	 	 	
High	staff	turnover	
(generally)	
Skilled	staff	are	always	in	short	supply.		 	 	 	
Lack	of	skilled	
workers	
Insufficient	availability,	internationally	or	
locally.		
	 	 	
Coordination	costs	
Resources	for	meeting,	travelling	and	hiring	
special	staff	for	coordination	are	limited.	
	 	 	
Cultural	conflicts	
Different	ways	of	working,	living	and	thinking	
which	can	create	conflicts	in	certain	situations.	
	 	 	
Not	everyone	is	in	
the	information	loop	
People	are	excluded	which	leads	to	not	having	
specific	information.	
	 	 	
 
 
 
Comments:		
 
5.	Environment	
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8.7 Declaration	of	Authorship	
	
"I	hereby	declare	that	this	thesis	is	my	own	work,	that	it	has	been	created	by	me	without	the	
help	of	others,	using	only	the	sources	referenced,	and	that	I	will	not	supply	any	copies	of	this	
thesis	to	any	third	parties	without	written	permission	by	the	head	of	this	degree	program."	
	
At	the	same	time,	all	rights	to	this	thesis	are	hereby	assigned	to	ZHAW	Zurich	University	of	
Applied	Sciences,	except	for	the	right	to	be	identified	as	its	author.	
Last	name/first	name	of	student	(in	block	letters)	
	
Student's	signature	
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8.8 Student’s	Confidentiality	Statement	
	
Master’s	Thesis:		
Information	Flow	in	Humanitarian	Relief	Operations	
	
The	student,	Andrea	Rominger,	hereby	confirms	with	his/her	signature	on	this	document	that	
he/she	will	not	use	the	information	received	from	Medair	(name	of	organization)	for	any	other	
purpose	than	 for	his/her	Master’s	 thesis,	 Information	Flow	 in	Humanitarian	Relief	Operations,	
and	that	this	information	will	not	be	made	available	to	any	third	party	at	any	time	without	the	
express	permission	of	Medair	(name	of	organization).	
	
The	 term	 “third	 party”	 refers	 to	 anyone	 not	 involved	 in	 the	 supervision	 or	 evaluation	 of	 this	
Master‘s	thesis.	
	
	
Winterthur,	26.	June	2017	
(Place,	date)	 (Student’s	signature)	
	 	
	 96	
	 	
	 97	
8.9 Confidentiality	Agreement	
	
Confidentiality	(Non-Disclosure)	Agreement	Concerning	a	Master’s	
Thesis	in	the	Consecutive	MSc	Programs	at	ZHAW	Zurich	University	of	Applied	Sciences	
	
Andrea	Rominger	is	the	author	of	a	Master’s	thesis	entitled	Information	Flow	in	Humanitarian	Relief	
Operations.	While	carrying	out	project	work	in	connection	with	this	Master’s	thesis,	he/she	may	have	
access	to	confidential	information	which	he/she	may	also	disclose	or	make	use	of	in	his/her	Master’s	
thesis.	
	
The	individuals	at	ZHAW	who	have	some	involvement	in	the	Master’s	thesis	therefore	agree	to	keep	
confidential	all	information	disclosed	in	it.		
	
In	particular,	they	agree	to:		
§ Withhold	any	confidential	information	disclosed	in	the	Master’s	thesis	from	any	third	party	outside	
ZHAW.	This	does	not	include,	and	expressly	allows,	the	use	of	plagiarism	detection	software.	If	
asked	to	do	so	by	the	party	whose	confidential	information	is	being	disclosed,	the	Master’s	thesis	
shall	be	completely	erased	from	the	database.	
§ Exercise	due	care	in	storing	the	Master’s	thesis.	
§ Ensure	that	any	confidential	information	disclosed	is	not	used	for	any	other	purposes	within	ZHAW.		
	
The	obligation	to	maintain	confidentiality	does	not	apply	if	the	information:		
	
§ Is	common	knowledge	or	generally	available.	
§ Has	been	known	to	the	recipient	before	it	was	disclosed	by	the	author	of	the	Master’s	thesis.	
§ Is	or	will	be	generally	available	without	violating	the	confidentiality	agreement.	
§ Has	been	developed	or	created	by	a	member	of	ZHAW	without	using	the	information	to	which	this	
confidentiality	agreement	refers	or	has	been	received	by	a	member	of	ZHAW	from	a	third	party	of	
whom	it	can	be	assumed	by	that	member	of	ZHAW	that	he/she	had	the	right	to	disclose	such	
information.	
§ Has	to	be	disclosed	due	to	a	legal	or	contractual	obligation.	In	particular,	this	may	be	the	case	if	
there	is	an	appeal	against	the	examination	result	of	a	Master’s	thesis.	The	party	whose	confidential	
information	is	being	disclosed	acknowledges	that	in	such	a	case	ZHAW	is	obliged	to	disclose	the	
information	to	an	appeal	board.		
	
Equally,	the	obligation	to	maintain	confidentiality	does	not	apply	if:		
§ The	confidential	information	being	disclosed	no	longer	merits	protection.	
§ The	party	whose	confidential	information	is	being	disclosed	is	no	longer	interested	in	restricting	this	
information	to	a	limited	circle	of	people.	
§ The	party	whose	confidential	information	is	being	disclosed	has	given	his/her	express	permission	in	
writing	that	the	recipient	of	this	confidential	information	is	released	from	his/her	obligation	of	
confidentiality.		
Anyone	asserting	that	there	is	no	obligation	to	maintain	confidentiality	must	be	able	to	support	this	
assertion.	
	
Winterthur,	___________________________	(date)	
	
	
________________________________________________________	
Signature(s)	of	recipient(s)	of	confidential	information	at	ZHAW	
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